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Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) methods are incorporated into 
systems for the purpose of avoiding unanticipated failures that can impact system 
safety, result in additional life cycle cost, and/or adversely affect the availability of a 
system.  Availability is the probability that a system will be able to function when 
called upon to do so. Availability depends on the system’s reliability (how often it 
fails) and its maintainability (how efficiently and frequently it is pro-actively 
maintained, and how quickly it can be repaired and restored to operation when it does 
fail).  Availability is directly impacted by the success of PHM. Increasingly, 
customers of critical systems are entering into “availability contracts” in which the 
customer either buys the availability of the system (rather than actually purchasing 
the system itself) or the amount that the system developer/manufacturer is paid is a 
function of the availability achieved by the customer. Predicting availability based on 
known or predicted system reliability, operational parameters, logistics, etc., is 
relatively straightforward and can be accomplished using several methods and many 
  
existing tools.  Unfortunately in these approaches availability is an output of the 
analysis.  The prediction of system’s parameters (i.e., reliability, operational 
parameters, and/or logistics management) to meet an availability requirement is 
difficult and cannot be generally done using today’s existing methods.  While 
determining the availability that results from a set of events is straightforward, 
determining the events that result in a desired availability is not.   
This dissertation presents a “design for availability” methodology that starts 
with an availability requirement and uses it to predict the required design, logistics 
and operations parameters.  The method is general and can be applied when the inputs 
to the problem are uncertain (even the availability requirement can be represented as 
a probability distribution).  The method has been demonstrated on several examples 





































Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor  Peter Sandborn, Chair 
Professor  Martin Dresner 
Professor  Abhijit Dasgupta 
Professor  Bilal M. Ayyub 












































To my parents, my wife, my brother and my sisters. Also, I would like to 




I would like to acknowledge my advisor, Prof. Peter Sandborn, for his 
support, guidance, and encouragement. I would like to acknowledge the National 
Science Foundation, Division of Design and Manufacturing Innovation (Grant 
Number: CMMI-1129697), for their support.  I would also like to thank the more than 
100 companies and organizations that support research at the Center for Advanced 
Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE) at the University of Maryland annually.  
Specifically, I would like to acknowledge the members of the Prognostics and Health 
Management (PHM) Consortium at CALCE who provided valuable feedback and 




Table of Contents 
 
Dedication ..................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Background .................................................................................................... 4 
1.2. Research Scope and Objectives ................................................................... 11 
Chapter 2: Maintenance ROI Model ........................................................................... 14 
2.1. Discrete Event Simulation Maintenance Planning Model ........................... 16 
2.2. Fixed-Schedule Maintenance Interval ......................................................... 18 
2.3. Data-Driven (Precursor to Failure Monitoring) Methods ............................ 18 
2.4. Model-Based (LRU-Independent) Methods ................................................ 20 
2.5. Discrete Event Simulation Implementation Details ..................................... 23 
2.6. Spares Management ..................................................................................... 26 
2.7. Operational Profile ....................................................................................... 27 
2.8. Implementation Costs .................................................................................. 29 
2.9. Return on Investment (ROI) Calculation ..................................................... 30 
2.10. Summary ...................................................................................................... 33 
Chapter 3: Design for Availability .............................................................................. 34 
3.1. Domain of Applicability – An Example Design for Availability Problem 
Statement................................................................................................................. 34 
3.2. Introduction to Design for Availability........................................................ 36 
3.3. Design for Availability Approach ................................................................ 38 
Chapter 4: Application of the Methodology ............................................................... 53 
4.1. Case Study Data Inputs ................................................................................ 54 
4.2. Use of Design for Availability to Determine System Parameters Affecting 
either Uptime or Downtime .................................................................................... 55 
4.3. Use of Design for Availability to Determine System Parameters Affecting 
both Uptime and Downtime .................................................................................... 71 
Chapter 5: Summary and Contributions ..................................................................... 87 
5.1. Summary ...................................................................................................... 87 
5.2. Contributions................................................................................................ 89 
5.3. Potential Broader Impacts of this Work ....................................................... 90 
5.4. Future Work ................................................................................................. 91 
Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 93 




List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Data Defining Unscheduled Maintenance Operational Profile ………….28 
Table 4.1: Implementation Costs …………………………………………………....54 
Table 4.2: Operational Profile ……………………………………………………….55 
Table 4.3: Spares Inventory …………………………………………………………56 
Table 4.4: Spares Inventory …………………………………………………………73 
Table A.1: Spares Inventory ………………………………………………………...95 








List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Data-driven (precursor to failure monitoring) modeling approach. 
Symmetric triangular distributions are chosen for illustration. Note, the LRU TTF 
PDF (left) and the data-driven TTF PDF (right) are not the same (they could have 
different shapes and sizes) …………………………………………………………..18 
Figure 2.2: Model-based (LRU-independent) modeling approach. Symmetric 
triangular distributions are chosen for illustration. Note, the LRU TTF PDF (left) and 
the model-based method TTF PDF (right) are not the same (they could have different 
shapes and sizes) …………………………………………………………………….22 
Figure 2.3: Temporal ordering of implementation cost inclusion in the discrete event 
simulation ……………………………………………………………………………23 
Figure 2.4: Spares management for a single socket …………………………………26 
Figure 3.1: Design for Availability Methodology …………………………………..38 
Figure 3.2: Availability variations as a function of time ……………………………40 
Figure 3.3: Scenarios of downtimes requirement …………………………………...46 
Figure 3.4: General case of updating downtime requirement ……………………….48 
Figure 3.5: General case of updating uptime requirement …………………………..48 
Figure 4.1: Weibull distribution of TTFs (β=1.1, η=200 and γ=9000) ……………...57 
Figure 4.2: Implication of the inventory model parameters on the timeline ………..58 
Figure 4.3: (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed 
maximum allowable Inventory Lead Time (ILT) in operational hours, for an 
unscheduled maintenance policy. (c) Availability probability distribution generated 
using the computed ILT (Figure 4.3.b) ……………………………………………...60 
Figure 4.4: Solution process ………………………………………………………...60 
Figure 4.5: Computed maximum allowable inventory lead time (ILT) for unscheduled 
maintenance policy, and for a data-driven PHM approach ………………………….62 
Figure 4.6: Variation of life cycle cost and inventory lead time with data-driven PHM 
prognostic distance …………………………………………………………………..63 
Figure 4.7: Computed TTF cumulative distribution function for unscheduled 
maintenance and data-driven PHM ………………………………………………….66 
Figure 4.8: Life cycle cost per socket for a 1000 socket population. (a) Life cycle cost 
per socket for an unscheduled maintenance. (b) Life cycle cost per socket for a data-
driven PHM approach ……………………………………………………………….68 
Figure 4.9: Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM 
relative to unscheduled maintenance that meets the availability requirement ………69 
 vii 
 
Figure 4.10: Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM 
relative to unscheduled maintenance that uses an ILT distribution generated by the 
data-driven PHM …………………………………………………………………….70 
Figure 4.11: TTF implication on the operational timeline …………………………..74 
Figure 4.12: Updating the TTFs, UTs and DTs ……………………………………..76 
Figure 4.13: (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed 
minimum allowable reliability (TTF) in operational hours, for an unscheduled 
maintenance policy. (c) Availability probability distribution generated using the 
computed TTF (Figure 4.13.b) ………………………………………………………77 
Figure 4.14: Variations of life cycle cost and minimum allowable reliability (TTF) 
with data-driven PHM prognostic distance ………………………………………….78 
Figure 4.15: Computed minimum allowable reliability (TTF) distribution for 
unscheduled maintenance and data-driven PHM ……………………………………80 
Figure 4.16: Computed TTF cumulative distribution function for unscheduled 
maintenance and data-driven PHM ………………………………………………….82 
Figure 4.17: (a) Life cycle cost per socket for an unscheduled maintenance policy. (b) 
Life cycle cost per socket for a data-driven PHM approach ………………………...83 
Figure 4.18: Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM 
relative to unscheduled maintenance that meets the availability requirement ………85 
Figure 4.19: Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM 
relative to unscheduled maintenance that uses a TTF distribution generated by a data-
driven PHM ………………………………………………………………………….86 
Figure A.1: Weibull distribution of TTFs (β=1.1, η=200 and γ=9000) ……………..94 
Figure A.2: (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed 
spares threshold (ST), for a data-driven PHM approach. (c) Availability probability 
distribution generated using the computed ST (Figure A.2.b) ………………………95 
Figure A.3: (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed 
replenishment spares (RS), for an unscheduled maintenance policy. (c) Availability 













Chapter 1: Introduction 
Availability is the ability of a service or a system to be functional when it is 
requested for use or operation. The availability of an item is a function of its 
reliability and logistics management (including repairs, replacements and inventory 
management). Availability accounts for both the frequency of failure (reliability) and 
the ability to restore the service or system to operation after a failure 
(maintainability). The dependency on maintenance generally translates into how 
quickly it can be repaired upon failure and are usually driven by the logistics 
management and are directly influenced by Prognostics and Health Management 
(PHM) approaches that may be used. The frequency of the failure is related to the 
reliability of the system, i.e., how long it will be operational (i.e., “up”) before it fails. 
Availability is a significant issue for many real world systems. A failure, i.e., a 
decrease of availability, of an ATM machine causes inconvenience to customers; the 
unavailability of a point-of-sale system to retail outlets can generate a huge financial 
loss; the unavailability a medical device or of hospital equipment can result in loss of 
life; unavailability of servers causes loss of data; poor availability of alternative 
energy generation (e.g., wind farms) can make them non-viable; and the 
unavailability of aircraft cause airlines to cancel or delay flights and military missions 
to be canceled. In these systems, insuring the availability of the system is important 
and the owners of the systems are often willing to pay a premium for higher 
availability. For many safety, mission, and infrastructure critical systems, availability 
is a more important design criteria than acquisition cost. 
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Several different types of availability can be measured (e.g., inherent, 
achieved, operational, etc.) [1]. This dissertation is focused on the operational 
availability since it implicitly incorporates other forms of availability and it is the 
most commonly used form of availability in availability contracts; however, the 
methodology could be easily adjusted to incorporate other types of availability. 
Operational availability is the probability that a system or piece of equipment 
operates ordinarily, i.e. functional and available for operation when requested, over a 
specific period of time under stated conditions [2, 3]. Operational availability (A0) 
accounts for all types of maintenance and logistics downtimes. It is computed as the 






=  (1.1) 
where uptime is the total accumulated operational time during which the system is up 
and running and able to perform the tasks that are expected from it; while downtime 
is generated when the system is down and not operating when requested due to repair, 
replacement, waiting for spares or any other logistics delay time. The summation of 
the accumulated uptimes and downtimes represents the total operation time for the 
system. 
Customers of avionics, large scale production lines, servers, and infrastructure 
service providers with high availability requirements are increasingly interested in 
buying the availability of a system, instead of actually buying the system itself; 
therefore, the concept of “availability-based contracting” has been introduced. 
Availability based contracts are a subset of outcome based contracts [4]; where the 
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customer pays for the delivered outcome, instead of paying for specific logistics 
activities, system reliability management or other tasks. Basically, in this type of 
contract, the customer pays the service or system provider to ensure a specific 
availability requirement.  For example the Availability Transformation: Tornado 
Aircraft Contract–ATTAC [5], is an availability contract, where BAE Systems has 
agreed to support the Tornado GR4 aircraft fleet at a specified availability level 
throughout the fleet service life for the UK Ministry of Defense. The agreement aims 
to implement a new cost-effective approach to improve the availability of the fleet 
while minimizing the life cycle cost [5]. Another form of outcome-based contracting 
that is used by the U.S. Department of Defense is called performance-based 
contracting (or PBL – Performance Based Logistics).  In PBL contracts the contractor 
is paid based on the results achieved, not on the methods used to perform the tasks [6, 
7]. Availability contracts, and most outcome-based contacting, include cost penalties 
that could be assessed for failing to fulfill a specified availability requirement within 
a defined time frame (or a contract payment schedule that is based on the achieved 
availability). 
The evaluation of an availability requirement is a challenging task for both 
suppliers and customers. From a suppliers’ perspective, it is not trivial to estimate the 
cost of delivering a specific availability.  Entering into an availability contract is a 
non-traditional way of doing business for the suppliers of many types of safety- and 
mission-critical systems. For example, the traditional avionics supply chain business 
model is to sell the system; and then separately provide the sustainment of the system. 
As a result, the avionics suppliers sell the system for whatever they have to in order to 
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obtain the business, knowing that they will make their money on the long-term 
sustainment of the system. From a customers’ perspective, the amount of money that 
should be spent on a specific availability contract is also a mysterious quantity – if a 
choice has to be made between two offers of availability contracts where the value of 
the promised availabilities are close (e.g., one contract offers an availability of 95% at 
any defined time, and the other one offers 97%), how much money should the 
customer be willing to spend for a specific availability improvement?  
 
1.1. Background 
Types of Availability  
Many different types of availability measures exist [1]; the most commonly 
used are: instantaneous, mean, steady-state, inherent, achieved, and operational 
availability. The main differences between these forms of availability are the types of 
activities that are excluded or included in the accumulated downtime and uptime 
values. 
The instantaneous availability is the probability that a system will be 
operational at any time during its entire operational support life. Note, this probability 
could change after every repair event, since the reliability of the system either 
decreases or increases, due to the repair renewal function. The mean availability is 
related to the instantaneous availability; it is the mean value of the instantaneous 
availability over a defined period of time. The steady-state availability is defined as 
the limit of the instantaneous availability as time approaches infinity, i.e., after a 
significant number of repair events. Inherent availability is purely determined by the 
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design of the system and the unscheduled maintenance actions. It assumes that the 
logistics management does not generate any delay time; i.e., the system is used under 
ideal logistics management. Similar to the inherent availability, the achieved 
availability assumes an ideal logistics management. However, it incorporates both 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance into the accumulated downtimes. Basically, 
it is the probability that a system will operate satisfactorily in an ideal support 
environment. Finally, the operational availability, which is the most common type of 
availability appearing in availability contracts, is a measure of the availability that the 
customer actually experiences. Operational availability includes all sources of 
downtime (when the system is down while requested for operation), e.g., repair, 
replacement, waiting for spares replenishment, administrative downtime, or any other 
logistics downtime.  
Readiness is closely related to availability and is a widely used metric for 
military applications.  For availability, “downtime” is only operational downtime, 
while for readiness, “downtime” includes operational downtime, free time and storage 
time, [8].  Generally, the concept of readiness is broader than availability as it 
includes the operational availability of the system, the availability of the people who 
are needed to operate the system, and the availability of the infrastructure and other 
resources needed to support the operation of the system. 
 
PHM (Prognostics and Health Management)  
Most systems are repaired or replaced upon failure. However, for safety-
critical systems, a failure could be very costly, even catastrophic. PHM [9] provides 
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advanced warning of failures as well as appropriate decision making processes for 
maintenance planning. Prognostics is defined as the process of predicting the future 
life of a system or a product. Whereas, health management is the capability to make 
appropriate decisions about maintenance actions and/or other logistics parameters, 
based on prognostics information. PHM provides an opportunity for lowering 
sustainment costs, improving maintenance decision-making, maximizing availability, 
and providing product usage feedback into the product design and validation process. 
PHM implementation represents a potential transition from the unscheduled 
maintenance policy, where the system or component is repaired or replaced upon 
failure, to a scheduled maintenance policy, where a sustainment approach 
methodology is adopted to repair or replace the system or component before failure. 
A subset of PHM that is only focused on reducing maintenance costs is 
referred to as Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) [10].  CBM is a set of 
maintenance processes and capabilities derived from real-time assessment of a 
system’s condition.  The goal of CBM is to perform maintenance only upon evidence 
of need. 
 
Applicability to Electronic Systems  
 This dissertation’s primary target application is electronic systems.  While 
PHM and CBM have been performed on non-electronic systems for many years 
(sometimes known as structural health monitoring), it is far less prevalent for 
electronics.  This is due to several factors including difficulties in identifying 
precursors to failure in electronics and the larger number of different failure 
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mechanisms (and potential failure locations).  Performing PHM for electronics is also 
difficult because of the high rate of electronics evolution compared to non-electronic 
systems (e.g., by the time one learns the warning signs of failure, the technology 
changes). Electronic systems maintenance culture is also historically based on 
“unscheduled maintenance” where systems are run to failure and then replaced or 
repaired.  While the majority of the work in this dissertation is generally applicable to 
non-electronic systems, the case study examples considered will be electronic 
systems. 
 
Logistics Management  
Logistics is the management of the flow of the existing resources of a process 
or a service to perform a specific operational task or to meet a customers’ requirement 
[11]. Logistics management provides a means to evaluate and control information 
flow. In an operational system environment, logistics management usually includes 
inventory, man power, administrative processing, transportation, etc. Each one of 
these activities could induce a delay time resulting in an operational downtime of the 
system. However, this dissertation will focus on the logistics delays related to 
maintenance and inventory management. The maintenance actions could generate 
operational downtimes based on the adopted maintenance policy, repair time, and 
replacement time. The inventory management could produce a delay when the system 






Logistics, maintenance, and availability can be evaluated using several 
different methods; one common method is discrete event simulation.  A discrete-
event simulation represents a set of chronological events where each event occurs at 
an instant in time and marks a change of state in the system. Time-based and event-
based simulations are considered the two primary discrete-simulation modeling 
techniques. Time-based models follow the progress of the process as it occurs at 
discrete points in simulation time. At each time step the state of the process is 
observed precisely; however, its progress between any two consecutive time steps is 
assumed to be negligible and undetermined by any external observer. Thus, time-
based modeling techniques assume that important changes only occur at the discrete 
time steps and the choice of the time step is based on the succession of the events as 
they occur in the simulation time. In event-based models, the occurrence of the events 
drives the progress of the modeled process, i.e., the process is event-dependent not 
time-dependent. In event-based modeling, the simulation is tracking the occurrence of 
the events as they happen. At every event the progress step, i.e., time step, is 
determined based on the occurrence of the next event, where the event refers to any 
significant incident associated with the state of the modeled process [13, 14]. 
Discrete-event simulation is commonly used to predict the availability and life cycle 




Availability predictions used during the design and support of real systems are 
also performed using Markov models [16, 17].1 However, while discrete event 
simulators track the current state of the system, and based on the present events, 
predict the occurrence of future events; Markov models do not explicitly embrace the 
concept of future events, rather they track the model state at each time step and 
sample how long the model will be in the current state before it switches to the next 
state [18]. Basically, each event in a discrete event simulator depends on the time 
spent in that event and the path that led to it, while Markov models depend only on 
the current state of the model regardless of the duration spent in the current state and 
the path that led to it [19]. Discrete-event simulators accumulate the outcomes 
resulting from the type and duration of previous events; and then use only the set of 
data inputs that are necessary at a specific point on the timeline to predict future 
events. Markov models incorporate all provided data to generate an analytical 
solution and use it to determine the current model state and to move to the next state.  
Discrete-event simulators are generally more efficient than Markov models 
for modeling complex systems with large numbers of variables, specifically in data 
capturing without aggregation [19, 20]. In general, discrete-event simulators order the 
failure and maintenance events for a system temporally, and the durations associated 
with the failure and maintenance events can be readily accumulated to estimate 
availability. Thus, it is straightforward for a discrete-event simulation to compute the 
                                                 
1 Other methods that are not discrete-event simulator based or Markov models for determining 
availability exist as well (e.g., [21], [22], [23], and many others), but most of these are confined to the 
evaluation of extremely simple systems that while preserving the essence of real problems, often have 
a too limited scope or are too oversimplified to be of practical value to problems where every input is 




availability based on a particular sequence of failures, logistics and maintenance 
events. This dissertation will focus on discrete-event simulation based availability 
calculations. 
  Discrete-event simulation is often a preferred approach to modeling the 
maintenance of real systems when many different failure mechanisms (and/or 
different parts), all characterized by different failure distributions must be 
concurrently included within the model.  This complexity is compounded by the 
necessity to consider a large population of systems in order to generate viable 
summary statistics. 
Two common mechanisms that may include elements of availability 
contracting are Product Service Systems (PSS) and leasing models.  PSS provide both 
the product and its service/support based on the customer’s requirements [24], which 
could include an availability requirement. Lease contracts [25] are use-oriented PSS, 
where the ownership of the product is usually retained by the service provider. A 
lease contract may indicate not only the basic product and service provided but also 
other use and operation constraints such as the failure rate threshold.  In leasing 
agreements the customer has an implicit expectation of a minimum availability, but 








1.2. Research Scope and Objectives 
The objective of this dissertation was to develop a “Design for Availability” 
methodology that enables the prediction of the system reliability, operational 
parameters, and/or logistics management parameters to meet a general availability 
requirement. The methodology must applicable to problems where the availability 
requirement is expressed as a probability distribution and uncertainties may be 
present in all the design and logistics properties of the system.  In addition, the design 
for availability methodology must allow the determination of prognostics and health 
management (PHM) parameters so as to enable the assessment of cost/availability 
tradeoffs associated with the inclusion of PHM within systems, where cost includes 
the assessment of return on investment (ROI).  
In order to achieve the objectives, described above, the following tasks have 
been completed: 
Task 1: Construction of a maintenance model that has the ability to 
incorporate reliability information, implementation cost, and accommodate different 
maintenance policies. This model is a discrete-event simulator that allows the 
calculation of life cycle cost and ROI for different PHM approaches.  This task was 
completed by another student prior to the start of this dissertation, see [26].  
Task 2:  Extend the maintenance model (Task 1) to include logistics 
management elements, i.e., specifically detailed spares management.  This includes 
initial spares, spare replenishment criteria, lead time for spare replenishment, spares 
carrying cost, etc.  Inclusion of a spares management model allows the calculation of 
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availability concurrent with life cycle cost and ROI.  Note this task creates the ability 
to calculate availability as an output (not an input). 
Task 3: Formulate a general Design for Availability model that uses an 
availability input to generate the required system parameters to meet an availability 
requirement.  This task is focused on the prediction of parameters affecting either 
uptime or downtime (not both). The following additional activities have been 
performed in this task: 
a) Implemented the methodology in software so it can be tested. 
b) Example application of the methodology to determine the inventory 
parameters (e.g., inventory lead time, threshold for spares 
replenishment, etc.) for a specific availability requirement. 
c) Performed formal verification of the method by using the generated 
inventory parameters as inputs into the maintenance model to compute 
availability, and compare the resultant availability (output) to the 
availability that was the original requirement (input).  
Task 4: Formulate a Design for Availability method to determine parameters 
that affect both uptime and downtime, for example, determining the reliability of the 
system for a specific availability requirement. This task will focus on determining a 
single consolidated reliability distribution describing a composite of the reliability 
associated with all relevant failure mechanisms for a system or subsystem. 
Task 5: Application of the Design for Availability method to the performance 
of tradeoffs between different maintenance approaches, primarily, unscheduled 
maintenance and a data-driven PHM approach. 
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Task 6: Compute the life cycle cost and perform an ROI analysis concurrent 
with the application of the Design for Availability methodology. This included the 
following two subtasks: 
a) Automated the ROI calculation and development of a stochastic ROI 
analysis, using the Task 2 maintenance model.  




Chapter 2: Maintenance ROI Model 
This chapter2 describes a maintenance model that can be used to assess life 
cycle cost tradeoffs, including the Return on Investment (ROI), associated with 
various maintenance approaches.  This model was specifically formulated to allow 
PHM approaches to be evaluated and traded off.  This model forms a necessary basis 
for verifying the design for availability methodology and performing cost assessment 
concurrent with the determination of parameters satisfying availability requirements.  
This chapter represents Tasks 1 and 2 described in Section 1.2.3  
The modeling described in this chapter targets finding the optimum balance 
between avoiding failures and throwing away remaining useful life (RUL).  Two 
systems, fielded and used under similar conditions, will not generally fail at exactly 
the same time due to differences in their manufacturing and materials, and due to 
differences in the environmental stress history they experience.  Therefore, system 
reliability is generally represented as a probability distribution over time or in relation 
to a specific environmental stress driver.  Likewise, the ability of a PHM approach to 
accurately predict RUL is not perfect due to sensor uncertainties, sensor gaps, sensor 
locations, and/or uncertainties in algorithms and models used.  Practically speaking, 
these uncertainties make 100% failure avoidance impossible to obtain; optimal 
maintenance planning for systems effectively becomes a trade-off between the 
potentially high costs of failure and the costs of throwing away remaining system life 
in order to avoid failures. 
                                                 




Although many applicable models for single- and multiunit maintenance 
planning have appeared [28, 29], the majority of the models assume that monitoring 
information is perfect (without uncertainty) and complete (all units are monitored 
identically), that is, maintenance planning can be performed with perfect knowledge 
as to the state of each unit. For many types of systems, and especially electronic 
systems, these are not good assumptions and maintenance planning, if possible at all, 
becomes an exercise in decision making under uncertainty with sparse data. The 
perfect monitoring assumption is especially problematic when the PHM approach is 
model-based because model-based approaches do not depend on precursors. A 
detailed discussion of model-based (LRU-independent) PHM methods is provided in 
Section 2.4. In model-based (LRU-independent) PHM methods, the PHM structure 
(or sensor) is independent of the LRUs, that is, the PHM structures are not coupled to 
a particular LRU’s manufacturing or material variations. Thus, for electronics, model-
based processes do not deliver any measures that correspond exactly to the state of a 
specific instance of a system. Previous work that treats imperfect monitoring includes 
[30, 31]. Perfect but partial monitoring has been previously treated [32]. 
This chapter describes a stochastic decision model that enables the optimal 
interpretation of model-based damage accumulation or data-driven precursor data and 







2.1. Discrete Event Simulation Maintenance Planning Model 
The maintenance planning model discussed here accommodates variable time 
to failure (TTF) of LRUs and variable RUL estimates associated with PHM 
approaches implemented within LRUs.4  The model considers both single and 
multiple sockets5  within a larger system. Discrete event simulation is used to follow 
the life of individual socket instances from the start of their field lives to the end of 
their operation and support.6  Discrete event simulation allows for the modeling of a 
system as it evolves over time by capturing the system’s changes as separate events 
(as opposed to continuous simulation where the system evolves as a continuous 
function). The evolutionary unit need not be time; it could be thermal cycles, or some 
other unit relevant to the particular failure mechanisms addressed by the PHM 
approach. Discrete event simulation has the advantage of defining the problem in 
terms of an intuitive basis, that is, a sequence of events, thus avoiding the need for 
formal specification. Discrete event simulation is widely used in maintenance and 
operations modeling [e.g., 33, 34 and 15] and has also previously been used to model 
PHM activities [35, 36 and 37].  
 
                                                 
4 LRU refers to Line Replaceable Unit that represents the lowest-level item that is replaceable or 
repairable in the system. 
5 A socket is a unique instance of an installation location for an LRU.  One instance of a socket 
occupied by an engine controller is its location on a particular engine. The socket may be occupied by 
a single LRU during its lifetime (if the LRU never fails), or multiple LRU if one or more LRU fail, and 
needs to be replaced. 
6 Alternatively, one could follow the lifetime of LRUs through their use, repair, reuse in other sockets, 
and disposal.  CBM models generally following LRUs.  The advantage of following sockets is that it 
enables the calculation of ROI, life-cycle cost and availability for sockets, however, the disadvantage 
for following sockets is that it implicitly assumes a stable population of LRUs and assumes that all 
LRUs returned to sockets after repair are approximately equivalent.  For system integrators and 
sustainers, following sockets is generally preferable to following LRUs, however, for subsystem 
manufacturers and sustainers, following LRUs may be preferable. 
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The model discussed in this chapter treats all inputs to the discrete event 
simulation as probability distributions, that is, a stochastic analysis is used, 
implemented as a Monte Carlo simulation. Various maintenance interval and PHM 
approaches are distinguished by how sampled TTF values are used to model PHM 
RUL forecasting distributions. To assess PHM, relevant failure mechanisms are 
segregated into two types.  Failure mechanisms that are random from the viewpoint of 
the PHM methodology are failure mechanisms that the PHM methodology is not 
collecting any information about (non-detection events). These failure mechanisms 
may be predictable but are outside the scope of the PHM methods applied. The 
second type refers to failure mechanisms that are predictable from the viewpoint of 
the PHM methodology—probability distributions can be assigned for these failure 
mechanisms.  
For the purposes of cost model formulation, PHM approaches are categorized 
as (a) a fixed-schedule maintenance interval; (b) a variable maintenance interval 
schedule for LRU instances that is based on inputs from a data-driven (precursor to 
failure) methodology; and (c) a variable maintenance interval schedule for LRU 
instances that is based on a model-based methodology. Note, for simplicity, the 
model formulation is presented based on “time” to failure measured in operational 







2.2. Fixed-Schedule Maintenance Interval 
A fixed-schedule maintenance interval is selected that is kept constant for all 
instances of the LRU that occupy a socket throughout the system life cycle. In this 
case the LRU is replaced on a fixed interval (measured in operational hours), that is, 
time-based prognostics. This is analogous to mileage-based oil changes in 
automobiles. 
 
2.3. Data-Driven (Precursor to Failure Monitoring) Methods 
Data-driven (precursor to failure monitoring) approaches are defined as a fuse 
or other monitored structure that is manufactured with or within the LRUs, or as a 
monitored precursor variable that represents a nonreversible physical process [38].7 
Health monitoring and LRU-dependent fuses are examples of data-driven methods. 
                                                 
7 In either case, the structure or parameter is coupled or correlated in some way to the manufacturing or 
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Figure 2.1. Data-driven (precursor to failure monitoring) modeling approach. Symmetric triangular 
distributions are chosen for illustration. Note, the LRU TTF PDF (left) and the data-driven TTF 
PDF (right) are not the same (they could have different shapes and sizes). 
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The parameter to be determined (optimized) is prognostic distance. The prognostic 
distance is a measure of how long before system failure the prognostic structures or 
prognostic cell is expected to indicate failure (e.g., in operational hours). The data-
driven methodologies forecast a unique TTF distribution for each instance of an LRU 
based on the instance’s TTF.8 For illustration purposes, the data-driven forecast is 
represented as a symmetric triangular distribution with a most likely value (mode) set 
to the TTF of the LRU instance minus the prognostic distance, Figure 2.1.  
The data-driven distribution has a fixed width measured in the relevant 
environmental stress units (e.g., operational hours) representing the probability of the 
prognostic structure indicating the precursor to a failure. As a simple example, if the 
prognostic structure was a LRU-dependent fuse that was designed to fail at some 
prognostic distance earlier than the system it protects, then the distribution on the 
right side of Figure 2.1 represents the distribution of fuse failures (the TTF 
distribution of the fuse). The parameter to be optimized in this case is the prognostic 
distance assumed for the precursor to failure monitoring forecasted TTF.  
The model proceeds in the following way: for each LRU TTF distribution 
sample (t1) taken from the left side of Figure 2.1, a precursor to failure monitoring 
TTF distribution is created that is centered on the LRU TTF minus the prognostic 
distance (t1–d). The precursor to failure monitoring TTF distribution is then sampled, 
and if the precursor to failure monitoring TTF sample is less than the actual TTF of 
the LRU instance, the precursor to failure monitoring is deemed successful. If the 
precursor to failure monitoring distribution TTF sample is greater than the actual TTF 
                                                 
8 In this model, all failing LRUs are assumed to be maintained via replacement or good-as-new repair; 
therefore, the time between failure and the time to failure are the same. 
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of the LRU instance, then precursor to failure monitoring was unsuccessful. If 
successful, a scheduled maintenance activity is performed and the timeline for the 
socket is incremented by the precursor to failure monitoring sampled TTF. If 
unsuccessful, an unscheduled maintenance activity is performed and the timeline for 
the socket is incremented by the actual TTF of the LRU instance. At each 
maintenance activity, the relevant costs are accumulated. 
 
2.4. Model-Based (LRU-Independent) Methods 
In model-based (LRU-independent) PHM methods, the PHM structure (or 
sensor) is independent of the LRUs, that is, the PHM structures are not coupled to a 
particular LRU’s manufacturing or material variations. An example of a model-based 
method is life consumption monitoring (LCM) [39]. LCM is the process by which a 
history of environmental stresses (e.g., thermal, vibration) is used in conjunction with 
PoF models to compute damage accumulated and thereby forecast RUL. The model-
based methodology forecasts a unique TTF distribution for each instance of an LRU 
based on its unique environmental stress history. For illustration purposes, the model-
based TTF forecast is represented as a symmetric triangular distribution with a most 
likely value (mode) set relative to the TTF of the nominal LRU and a fixed width 
measured in operational hours, Figure 2.2. Other distributions may be chosen and 
Vichare et al. [40] have shown how this distribution may also be derived from 
recorded environment history. The shape and width of the model-based method 
distribution depend on the uncertainties associated with the sensing technologies and 
uncertainties in the prediction of the damage accumulated (data and model 
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uncertainty). The variable to be optimized in this case is the safety margin assumed 
on the LRU-independent method forecasted TTF, that is, the length of time (e.g., in 
operation hours) before the LRU-independent method forecasted TTF the unit should 
be replaced. 
The model-based method proceeds in the following way: for each LRU TTF 
distribution sample (left side of Figure 2.2), an LRU-independent method TTF 
distribution is created that is centered on the TTF of the nominal LRU minus the 
safety margin—right side of Figure 2.2 (note, the model-based methods only know 
about the nominal LRU, not about how a specific instance of an LRU varies from the 
nominal). The LRU-independent method TTF distribution is then sampled, and if the 
LRU-independent method TTF sample is less than the actual TTF of the LRU 
instance, then the LRU-independent method was successful (failure avoided). If the 
LRU-independent method TTF distribution sample is greater than the actual TTF of 
the LRU instance, then the LRU-independent method was unsuccessful. If successful, 
a scheduled maintenance activity is performed and the timeline for the socket is 
incremented by the LRU-independent method sampled TTF. If unsuccessful, an 
unscheduled maintenance activity is performed and the timeline for the socket is 
incremented by the actual TTF of the LRU instance.9  
                                                 
9 LRU-independent fuses and canary devices may require replacement for each alert that they provide 
whether that alert is a false positive or not. After the PHM devices are removed for maintenance, to 
download data, or for other activities, reinstallation follows.   
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In the maintenance models discussed, a random failure component may also 
be superimposed as discussed in [27]. The fixed-schedule maintenance, data-driven 
and model-based method models are implemented as stochastic simulations, in which 
a statistically relevant number of sockets are considered in order to construct 
histograms of costs, availability, and failures avoided. Again, at each maintenance 
activity, the relevant costs are accumulated. 
The fundamental difference between the data-driven and model-based 
methods is that in the data-driven method the TTF distribution associated with the 
PHM structure (or sensor) is unique to each LRU instance, whereas in the model-
based method the TTF distribution associated with the PHM structure (or sensor) is 
tied to the nominal LRU and is independent of any manufacturing or material 
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Figure 2.2. Model-based (LRU-independent) modeling approach. 
 Symmetric triangular distributions are chosen for illustration. Note, the LRU TTF PDF (left) and the 
model-based method TTF PDF (right) are not the same (they could have different shapes and sizes).  
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2.5. Discrete Event Simulation Implementation Details 
The model follows the history of a single socket or a group of sockets from 
time zero to the end of support life for the system. To generate meaningful results, a 
statistically relevant number of sockets (or systems of sockets) are modeled and the 
resulting cost and other metrics are presented in the form of histograms. The 
scheduled and unscheduled costs computed for the sockets at each maintenance event 
are given by 
Vf)TV+(+fTf)C+(=fCC irepairireplace iLRU repairiLRUisocket −− 11  (2.1) 
 
where Csocket i is the life-cycle cost of socket i; CLRU i is the cost of procuring a new 
LRU; CLRU repair i  is the cost of repairing an LRU in socket i; f is the fraction of 
maintenance events on socket i that require replacement of the LRU in socket i with a 
new LRU; Treplace i is the time to replace the LRU in socket i; Trepair i is the time to 
repair the LRU in socket i; and V is the value of time out of service. 
Note, the values of f and V generally differ depending on whether the 
maintenance activity is scheduled or unscheduled. 
Time
• Base LRU recurring cost
• PHM LRU recurring cost
• LRU/socket associated 
nonrecurring cost
• System recurring cost




• Base LRU recurring cost
• PHM LRU recurring cost
 
 




As the discrete event simulation tracks the actions that affect a particular 
socket during its life cycle, the implementation costs are inserted at the appropriate 
locations, Figure 2.3. At the beginning of the life cycle, the non-recurring cost is 
applied. The recurring costs at the LRU level and at the system level are first applied 
here and subsequently applied at each maintenance event that requires replacement of 
an LRU (CLRU i, as in equation (2.1)). The recurring LRU-level costs include the base 
cost of the LRU regardless of the maintenance approach. Discrete event simulations 
that compare alternative maintenance approaches to determine the ROI of PHM must 
include the base cost of the LRU itself without any PHM-specific hardware. If 
discrete event simulation is used to calculate the life-cycle cost for a socket under an 
unscheduled maintenance policy, then the recurring LRU-level cost is reduced to the 
cost of replacing or repairing an LRU upon failure. Under a policy involving PHM, 
the failure of an LRU results in additional costs for the hardware, assembly, and 
installation of the components used to perform PHM. The infrastructure costs are 
distributed over the course of the socket’s life cycle and are charged periodically. 
The model assumes that the TTF distribution represents manufacturing and 
material variations from LRU to LRU. The range of possible environmental stress 
histories that sockets may see are modeled using an environmental stress history 
distribution. Note, the environmental stress history distribution need not be used if the 
TTF distribution for the LRUs includes environmental stress variations. The 
environmental stress history distribution is not used with the data-driven or model-
based methods. Random TTFs are characterized by a uniform distribution with a 
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height equal to the average random failure rate per year and a width equal to the 
inverse of the average random failure rate. 
Uncertainty, which must be propagated throughout the life-cycle simulations 
of systems, is present at multiple levels in the calculation of RUL. The data collected 
by the prognostic devices, the material inputs reliability modeling depends on, and the 
underlying assumptions of electronic failure behavior that are applied to produce 
reliability estimates may not always be accurate.  
Uncertainties can be handled using different approaches; however, the most 
general method of handling uncertainties is to use a Monte Carlo analysis approach in 
which each input parameter is optionally represented as a probability distribution.  
The implementation of the maintenance modeling discussed in this chapter is 
implemented as a Monte Carlo analysis that follows a statistically relevant number of 




2.6. Spares Management 
The maintenance planning simulation can be performed assuming that spares 
can be purchased as needed, or that spares reside in an inventory.  Figure 2.4 shows a 
graphical representation of the sparing process in this model.  The spares inventory 
model includes the purchase of an initial quantity of spares (the purchase is assumed 
to happen at the start of the simulation).  As the LRUs in sockets fail and require 
spares, they are drawn from the inventory.  An inventory carrying cost is assessed per 
year based on the number of spares that reside in the inventory at the beginning of the 
year.  When the number of spares in the inventory drops below a defined threshold, 
additional spares are automatically purchased (this is called a spare replenishment).  
The replenishment spares become available in the inventory for use after a lead-time.  
Cost of money is assessed on all spares purchases, inventory, and replenishment 

























Only a fraction of the LRU failures require permanent spares because they 
cannot be repaired.  Repairable LRU failures only require spares for the time during 
their repair. 
Each socket is assumed to have its own independent inventory. In other 
words, I am assuming that these individual inventories could be equivalent to one or 
multiple large inventories that are used by the whole population of sockets. This 
means that each socket in the population is subject to the same spares management. 
This assumption is most appropriate for large populations of sockets where LRUs 
have the same TTF distributions, since on average each socket will use the same 
number of spares throughout its support life. This assumption doesn’t hold for a 
population of LRUs with different TTF distributions that draw from the same 
inventories; since each socket could use on average a different number of spares 
throughout its support life, thus the spares management will be different for each 
socket. 
Logistics management models that include detailed treatments of inventories 
and spares in the context of PHM appear in [36, 37, 41].   
 
2.7. Operational Profile 
The operational profile of systems equipped with PHM dictates how the 
information provided by PHM may be used to affect the maintenance and usage 
schedules. The effective costs associated with maintenance actions depend on when 
(and where) actions are indicated relative to some operational cadence. Cadences may 
be proscribed by business constraints, regulations, or mission requirements and may 
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be subject to change as user requirements shift. The cadence may be best described 
according to a probabilistic model rather than a timeline, that is, a defined probability 
of a maintenance request being issued before, during, or after a mission or particular 
type of use. The implications of the safety margins or prognostics distances will vary 
with the difference in cadence to affect the timing of maintenance actions.  
The operational profile is reflected in the maintenance modeling by varying 
the value of the parameter V in equation (2.1).  The value of an hour out of service, V, 
is set to a specific value if the maintenance is scheduled, but if the maintenance is 
unscheduled, the value of V is given by the data in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Data Defining Unscheduled Maintenance Operational Profile 
Maintenance Event Probability V 
Maintenance event before mission (during preparation) Pb Vb 
Maintenance event during mission Pd Vd 
Maintenance event after mission (during downtime) Pa Va 
 
 
“Before mission” represents maintenance requirements that occur while 
preparing to place the system into service, that is, while loading passengers onto the 
aircraft for a scheduled commercial flight.  “During mission” means that the 
maintenance requirement occurs while the system is performing a service and may 
result in interruption of that service, for example, making an emergency landing or 
abandoning a HMMWV by the side of the road during a convoy.  “After mission” 
represents time that the system is not needed, that is, the period of time from midnight 
to 6:00 am when the commercial aircraft could sit idle at a gate. 
When an unscheduled maintenance event occurs, a random number generator 
is used to determine the portion of the operational profile the event is in and the 
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corresponding value (V) used in the analysis.  This type of valuation in the discrete 
event simulation is only useful if a stochastic analysis that follows the life of a 
statistically relevant number of sockets is used. 
 
2.8. Implementation Costs 
Implementation costs are the costs associated with the realization of PHM in a 
system, the technologies and support necessary to integrate and incorporate PHM into 
new or existing systems. The costs of implementing PHM can be categorized as 
recurring, non-recurring, or infrastructural depending on the frequency, and role of 
the corresponding activities.  The implementation cost is the cost of enabling the 
determination of Remaining Useful Life (RUL) for the system.  
Non-recurring costs are associated with one-time only activities that typically 
occur at the beginning of the timeline of a PHM program, although disposal or 
recycling non-recurring costs would occur at the end. Non-recurring costs can be 
calculated on a per-LRU, per-socket, or per a group of LRU or sockets basis.  The 
specific non-recurring cost is calculated as 
qualdoctrainingdev_softdev_hardNRE CCCCCCC +++++= int  (2.2) 
Recurring costs are associated with activities that occur continuously or 
regularly during the PHM program. As with non-recurring costs, some of these costs 
can be viewed as an additional charge for each instance of a LRU, or for each socket 
(or for a group of LRU or sockets).  The recurring cost is calculated as 
installtestassemblyhard_addREC CCCC C +++=               (2.3) 
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Unlike recurring and non-recurring costs, infrastructure costs are associated 
with the support features and structures necessary to sustain PHM over a given 
activity period, and are characterized in terms of the ratio of money to a period of 
activity (i.e., dollars per operational hour, dollars per mission, dollars per year). The 
infrastructure costs are calculated as 
CINF = Cprognostic maintenance + Cdecision + Cretraining + Cdata  (2.4) 
See [42] for a detailed discussion of the various implementation cost 
contributions. 
 
2.9. Return on Investment (ROI) Calculation 
In general, ROI is the ratio of gain to investment. Equation (2.5) is a way of 











The central ratio in equation (2.5) is the classical ROI definition, and the ratio 
on the right is the form of ROI that is applicable to PHM assessment.  In the case of 
PHM, the investment includes all the costs necessary to develop, install, and support a 
PHM approach in a system; while the avoided cost is a quantification of the benefit 
realized through the use of a PHM approach.  Note that not all researchers that quote 
ROI numbers for the application of PHM to systems define ROI in the same way; 
therefore, published ROI may not be directly comparable in all cases.  Equation (2.5) 
is the standard definition used by the financial world for ROI. 
Viable business cases for PHM do not necessarily require that the ROI be 
greater than zero. ROI > 0, implies that there is a cost benefit.  In some cases, the 
 31 
 
value of PHM is not directly quantifiable in monetary terms, but is necessary in order 
to meet a system requirement that could not otherwise be attained, e.g., an availability 
requirement.  However, the evaluation of ROI (whether greater than or less than zero) 
is still a necessary part of any business case developed for PHM [42].  
For PHM, ROI must be measured relative to whatever methodology is 
currently used to manage the system.  For electronic systems, a common management 
approach is unscheduled maintenance. Following an unscheduled maintenance policy, 
systems are operated until failure, and are then repaired or replaced.  Applying 
equation (2.5) to measure ROI relative to unscheduled maintenance gives 










 ROI   (2.6) 
In my case, I define Ius = 0, i.e., the investment cost in unscheduled 
maintenance is indexed to zero by definition.  This does not imply that the cost of 
performing maintenance in the unscheduled case is zero (the cost of performing 
maintenance is part of Cus), but reflects that a maintenance approach relying purely on 
unscheduled maintenance makes no investment in PHM.  Setting Ius = 0, then 









 ROI  (2.7) 
Equation (2.7) measures ROI of a PHM approach relative to unscheduled 
maintenance; if CPHM  is equal to Cus, then ROI equals 0, the breakeven point.
10  
                                                 
10 Equation (2.7) is only valid for comparison of ROI to unscheduled maintenance, which is a 
convenient well defined solution to measure ROI.  Using equation (2.7), one can compare the relative 
ROI of multiple PHM approaches measured from unscheduled maintenance; however, the ROI of one 
PHM approach relative to another is not given by the difference between their ROI relative to 
unscheduled maintenance.  To evaluate ROI relative to a baseline other than unscheduled maintenance, 
appropriate values of Avoided Cost and Investment must be substituted into equation (2.5). 
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The investment cost is the effective cost per socket of implementing PHM, 
and then using the knowledge it creates to guide maintenance actions, and planning. 
The PHM investment cost is calculated as 
INFRECNREPHM CCCI ++=  (2.8) 
The costs of false alarm resolution, procurement of a different quantity of 
LRU than the number required by an unscheduled maintenance approach, and 
maintenance costs that differ from unscheduled maintenance are not included in the 
investment cost because they are the result of the investment, and are reflected in 
CPHM.  CPHM must also include the cost of money differences associated with 
purchasing LRU at maintenance events between unscheduled maintenance, and a 
PHM approach; i.e., even if both approaches end up purchasing the same number of 
replacement LRU for a socket, they may purchase them at different points in time 
resulting in different effective costs if the discount rate is non-zero.  If replacement 
LRU are drawn from an inventory of spares (as opposed to purchased as needed), 
then there may be no cost of money impact on ROI associated with the procurement 
of spares. 
The ROI in equation (2.7) can be calculated statically using values of Cus, 
CPHM, and IPHM that are averaged over an entire population of sockets.  However, in 
reality, a population of sockets will result in a distribution of ROI (every socket 
potentially having a different ROI).  To calculate the distribution of ROI, each 
member of the population has to be independently tracked through its lifetime 
assuming first an unscheduled maintenance policy, and then assuming a PHM 
maintenance approach (using identical samples from the distributions that represent 
 33 
 
the member’s characteristics and maintenance costs in a Monte Carlo analysis). In 
this manner, a separate ROI is calculated for each member of the population.  When 
the process is repeated on an entire population of sockets, a histogram of ROI is 
generated from which business case parameters can be extracted.  
 
2.10. Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the base maintenance model used in this 
dissertation.  Additional details on the formulation of the model can be found in [27] 
and [42].  Applications of this model appear in [27, 42, and 43].  This model has also 
been released as a software tool that is supported by CALCE for members of the 
CALCE PHM Consortium [44]. 
This model represents a forward discrete event simulator that can determine 
life cycle cost, ROI, and availability (as an output not an input).  In this dissertation, 
this simulation will be used: (a) to order events for the design for availability solution; 
(b) to generate availability outputs for verification of the design for availability; and 
(c) to concurrently calculate life cycle cost and ROI with the design for availability 
activities.   
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Chapter 3: Design for Availability  
This chapter describes the formulation of a general design for availability 
approach that uses an availability requirement (input) to generate system parameters.  
Parameters that depend on either uptime or downtime (but not both) and parameters 
that depend on both uptime and downtime are addressed. A detailed description of 
each step of the formulation and the application of the methodology is provided (for 
both types of system parameters). 
 
3.1. Domain of Applicability – An Example Design for Availability Problem 
Statement 
While availability is critical to the many different types of systems mentioned 
in Chapter 1, in this section I will briefly describe one particular design example so as 
to better define design for availability’s domain of applicability and to address how it 
could be incorporated into a design problem statement.  
Consider a multifunctional display (MFD) that is used in the cockpits of 
Boeing 737 aircraft. If the MFD is non-operational, the aircraft cannot takeoff, 
resulting in flight delays and/or cancelations, both of which cost an airline money. An 
airline decides that they wish to impose a 97% mean availability requirement on the 
MFD units across their entire fleet of 737s over some prescribed period of time 
subject to some range of operational conditions and operational schedule. Presumably 
this availability requirement is arrived at based on a flow down of other business 
requirements and targets. The airline’s availability requirement (and other operational 
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assumptions) represents a design problem that may be imposed on: the manufacturer 
of the MFD, the airline’s own procurement and support organizations, or both.  
First, consider the manufacturer of the MFD. One design attribute that the 
manufacturer can affect is the reliability of the MFD, which is actually represented by 
a composite of failure distributions corresponding to relevant failure mechanisms. 
Using a “design for availability” methodology, the manufacturer could use the 97% 
mean availability requirement coupled with the range of environment stress 
conditions that they expect the MFDs to encounter during operation to determine the 
required reliability distributions corresponding to one or more of the relevant failure 
mechanisms. The manufacturer could then modify the material selection, component 
selection, and/or design rules in order to meet the required reliability. 
Alternatively, the airline could use the mean availability requirement to enable 
selection between competing suppliers of the MFD unit. Obviously, the availability 
requirement could be used to determine the necessary composite reliability of a MFD 
unit and this could be used as a selection criteria. However, design of availability-
centric systems is not all about designing the object, it’s just as much about designing 
how you will support the object. To this end, consider the Inventory Lead Time (ILT).  
The ILT is the amount of time it takes to receive spares after they are ordered. The 
airline could impose their mean availability requirement along with the spares 
inventory (threshold for replenishment, inventory holding costs, maximum number of 
spares held, etc.) to determine a maximum allowable ILT for the MFD unit and then 
select the supplier of the MFD based on the supplier’s capability to provide spares 
that satisfy the required ILT. 
 36 
 
3.2. Introduction to Design for Availability 
Most availability and life cycle cost predictions used during the design and 
support of real systems are performed using discrete event simulators, e.g., Chapter 2 
and [15].  In general, discrete event simulators order the failure and maintenance 
events for a system temporally, and the times associated with the failure and 
maintenance events can be readily accumulated to estimate availability. Thus, it is 
straightforward for the simulation to compute the availability based on a particular 
sequence of failures, logistics and maintenance events. 
The requirements for PHM are based on a set of reliability, operational 
profile, and logistics parameters, which in turn are dependent on availability 
objectives. Thus, for the same availability requirement different sets of system 
parameters could be determined based on the selected PHM sustainment approach; 
i.e., the prediction of system parameters (to meet availability requirements) is 
dependent on the applied PHM sustainment approach. However, in general this 
prediction is a stochastic reverse simulation problem.  
Availability requirements can be satisfied by running discrete event simulators 
in the forward direction (forward in time) for many permutations of the system 
parameters and then selecting the inputs that generate the required availability output, 
e.g., [45, 46].  These “brute force” search-based approaches are computationally 
impractical for real problems (particularly for real-time problems), are unable to deal 
with general uncertainties, and can’t accommodate an availability requirement that is 
represented as a probability distribution.  There have also been attempts to perform 
reverse simulation (run discrete event simulators backwards in time) [47, 48], but this 
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has only been demonstrated on extremely simple problems with no applicability to 
the real world systems. While determining the availability that results from a 
sequence of events is straightforward, determining the events that result in a desired 
availability is not, and has not in general been done. Alternatively stated, availability 
is straightforward to predict based on the system’s reliability, operation, sparing, etc., 
however, the general prediction of the system parameters to meet a required 
availability (“design for availability”) has never been done and it is the goal of this 
dissertation   
To meet an availability requirement one can change the reliability, logistics or 
operation of a system or a process. For example, I may keep the same reliability and 
operational profile of the system, and change its logistics management (e.g., reduce 
the maintenance downtime by stocking spare parts in more locations). Similarly, 
reliability or operational characteristics (or some combination of them) could be 
modified to meet an availability requirement.  Deriving the appropriate system 
parameters for a specific availability requirement, will ease logistics management, 
avoid availability cost penalties, and predict the required reliability of the system. 
The goal of this work is to reverse the problem setup; this means, instead of 
solving for availability for a specific set of system parameters, I will solve for system 
parameters for a specific availability. The design for availability model could be used 
to generate system reliability, operation, sparing, etc., for a specific availability, i.e., 
for a specific uptime (time that the system is up and running as requested) and 
downtime (time that the system is down undergoing a repair or waiting for spares). 
The approach presented here is not based on running backwards discrete event 
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simulation, i.e., the model runs a forward discrete event simulation, but, instead of 
using system parameters to compute uptimes or downtimes, the new model uses the 
specified availability requirement (input) to impose the appropriate uptimes and 
downtimes, and solve for the selected unknown system parameters (output).  
 
3.3. Design for Availability Approach 
Figure 3.1 shows the steps to formulate and execute the design for availability 
solution. Details for each step of the process of determining the selected unknown 
system parameters concurrently (for a specific availability requirement) are discussed 
in the following sections.   
Determine where/when the availability requirement is imposed on the system
System availability requirement expressed (most generally) as a probability distribution





Parameters affecting both 
downtime and uptime 
Parameters affecting either 
downtime or uptime 
Start with a guess of the selected system 
parameter, to initiate the simulation
Determine the relationship between the known 
system parameters, required availability and 
the selected unknown system parameter(s)
Solve for the selected system parameter(s)
Impose the selected system parameter(s) 
requirement on the downtime and uptime
Impose a downtime or uptime requirement on 
each selected design and/or support parameter 
Determine the relationship between downtime 
or uptime and the selected system parameter(s)
Solve for the selected system parameter(s)
Update the imposed downtime or uptime
 
Figure 3.1.  Design for Availability Methodology. 
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Interpreting the Availability Requirement 
The design for availability methodology is applicable to any type of input of 
the availability requirement (e.g., single value, probability distribution, range of 
values, etc.). A realistic availability requirement is generally expressed as a 
probability distribution. Since, even when a contract specifies the availability 
requirement as a single value, the interpretation of this single value either leads to 
considering the average availability of a population of systems, i.e., the average of a 
distribution; or the single value is the minimum availability of all system instances 
within the population. These interpretations are consistent with the fact that the 
reliability of the product or system is represented as a probability distribution (or, 
more accurately a set of probability distributions each corresponding to a different 
relevant failure mechanism); thus using a logistics management plan that is common 
across the population, each system instance will have a different availability value 
depending on the failure dates of the subsystem instances that occupy it and the 
operational profile variations. 
 
Determine Where/When the Availability Requirement is Imposed 
To generalize the design for availability model, I adopt a conservative 
approach by fulfilling an availability requirement at all times during the entire support 
life. In other words, the model satisfies any availability contract requirement, 
regardless of the availability evaluation time intervals specified by the contract terms. 
However, if needed, the model could be adjusted to evaluate the availability 
requirement only at the contract’s defined times (which would be less conservative). 
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For the remainder of this discussion I will assume that the availability requirement 
implies that the operational availability (Ao) should not drop below the availability 
requirement value at any time during the entire support life.  
By analyzing the Ao variations based on equation (1.1), the Ao keeps 
decreasing during downtimes and increasing during uptimes. In other words, Ao 
reaches its local minimum values at the end of every downtime (e.g., points 1 and 2 in 
Figure 3.2). Thus, if the availability requirement is satisfied at the end of every 
downtime (minimum Ao values satisfy the requirement), it will be satisfied at all times 
during the support life of the system. Therefore my approach is to impose the 
availability requirement at the end of every downtime. 
 
Select the Design and/or Support Parameter to Solve for 
Different values of a system parameter could generate different downtimes 
and/or uptimes, resulting in different availability values. For example, to meet a 
specific availability requirement, the reliability of the system could be improved, 
and/or the logistics management could be modified. This means, once the availability 
requirement is defined, a decision has to be made upfront regarding which system 
 
Figure 3.2.  Availability variations as a function of time. 
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parameter the system manufacturer, provider or user is willing to change to meet the 
availability requirement. Once the system parameter that will be modified to meet the 
availability requirement is selected, the availability requirement will be used to solve 
for it, i.e., the availability requirement is used as an input to the model, and the 
selected unknown system parameter is one of the resulting outputs of the model. 
 
Determine the Type of System Parameter 
In the context of design for availability, there exist two distinct types of 
system parameters: parameters affecting either uptime or downtime (not both) and 
parameters concurrently affecting both uptime and downtime. As shown in Figure 3.1 
the steps to formulate and execute the design for availability solution are different for 
each type of system parameter.  
In the case of parameters affecting either uptime or downtime (not both), one 
of the two quantities (uptime or downtime) is known and can be determined from the 
known system parameters, while the other quantity is unknown. In other words, a 
change in the value of the selected unknown system parameter produces a change in 
only one of the two quantities (either uptime or downtime), while the other quantity is 
exclusively dependent on the other known system parameters. For example, if uptime 
is the known quantity (determined from the known system parameters), while the 
downtime is the unknown quantity that is imposed based on the required availability 
and the system generated uptimes. Then, the selected unknown system parameter 
solely depends on the downtime and is computed based on the imposed downtime.  
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However, in the case of parameters concurrently affecting both uptime and 
downtime, a change in the value of this type of parameter could produce a change in 
both uptime and downtime. Both quantities (uptime and downtime) are dependent on 
this type of parameters (reliability is a prime example). When one of these system 
parameters is unknown, then both uptime and downtime are unknown. Therefore, I 
cannot impose exclusively a downtime or uptime requirement as described in the 
previous paragraph. This means, a relationship between the known system 
parameters, required availability and the selected unknown system parameter needs to 
be defined, to solve for this type of system parameter. 
 
Parameters Affecting either Uptime or Downtime (not both) 
Impose an Uptime or Downtime requirement on the selected system parameter 
 The Ao is a function of accumulated uptimes and downtimes. Therefore, 
imposing an availability requirement means either imposing an uptime requirement 
while the downtime is automatically generated by the system parameters; or imposing 
a downtime requirement while the uptime is automatically generated by the system 
parameters. Note, for this type of system parameters (i.e., parameters affecting either 
uptime or downtime) either an uptime or a downtime requirement is imposed, not 
both.  In both cases, the imposed downtimes or uptimes are computed at defined 
times or events as a function of the required Ao. 
 Assuming that to satisfy an availability requirement I need to impose 
downtimes. In this case, I can ignore all uptimes and only focus on the required 
downtimes to fulfill the availability requirement; and then determine a relationship 
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that allows us to derive the system parameters that produce these downtimes. In this 
case, by generating the appropriate downtimes, only the system parameters that are 
responsible for generating the downtimes could be computed as outputs; other system 
parameters that are not involved in generating downtimes should be fixed, i.e., used 
only as inputs. Equations (3.1) and (3.2), which are derived from equation (1.1), 
express the relationships that are used to impose the first downtime (DT1) and a k
th 

























TD           (3.2) 
where Availability represents the specified availability requirement, and UTj 
corresponds to the jth uptime.   
 Basically, the criteria of imposing either an uptime or downtime requirement 
is based on the unknown system parameter that I desire to determine to fulfill a 
specific availability requirement. For example, if the uptime remains constant while 
varying a selected unknown system parameter, meaning that the uptime is 
independent of this unknown parameter; while, the downtime values are changing. 
Then I must impose the downtime to meet the availability requirement; and vice 





Determine the Relationship between Uptime or Downtime and the Selected System 
Parameter 
 Assume that the set of system parameter that I am interested in computing to 
meet the availability requirement is explicitly related to the downtimes (based on the 
criteria mentioned in the previous section), instead of the uptimes. Thus, I want to 
impose the downtime requirement. Then, I need to establish a relationship between 
the unknown set of system parameter and the imposed downtimes. Based on this 
relationship, the missing system parameters could be computed and updated as soon 
as the downtimes are determined. 
 In this case, a relationship between the selected unknown system parameters 
and the required availability needs to be determined in order to solve for the unknown 
system parameter. Basically, I have two unknown quantities: the unknown system 
parameter, and the downtime. Therefore, I need to establish two relationships to be 
able to solve for the two unknown quantities. Since availability is by definition a 
function of uptime and downtime; therefore I can solve for downtime as a function of 
the required availability and uptime, where uptime is a known quantity generated 
through the known systems parameters. This generates the first relationship; which is 
used to solve for the downtime. Also, since these types of system parameters 
explicitly affect the downtime, then the selected unknown system parameter could be 
expressed as a function of downtime; hence the second relationship; which is used to 
solve for the unknown system parameter. To summarize, the downtime is imposed 
through the availability requirement, then the imposed downtime quantity is used to 
solve for the selected unknown system parameter.  
 45 
 
 Defining a relationship between the selected system parameter and the 
downtime, allows the inclusion of the availability requirement into the computation of 
the selected system parameter. Notice, that in this section, for the purpose of 
illustration, I have assumed that the selected unknown system parameter affects the 
downtime; a similar approach could be adopted if the selected system parameter 
affects the uptime (instead of downtime). 
 
Update the Imposed Uptime or Downtime 
 In this section, for demonstration purposes, I will assume that the selected 
unknown system parameter is explicitly dependent on the required downtime to 
satisfy the availability requirement, while the rest of the system parameters are given 
and responsible for fully generating the uptime. However, before the end of this 
section I will provide an analogy for fulfilling the availability requirement by 
imposing the required uptime (instead of downtime), where the selected unknown 
system parameter is explicitly dependent on the uptime. 
 The model uses an availability requirement (input) to solve for a specific 
system parameter (output). My goal is to derive a unique system parameter value for 
a given availability requirement. Therefore, the model imposes the appropriate 
downtimes that satisfy the availability requirement; then, the system parameter is 
derived based on each imposed downtime. The procedure of defining the relationship 
between system parameter and required downtimes is discussed in Section 3.5.2. 
However, the challenge here is the fact that availability is not determined by a single 
downtime value, but rather a sequence of downtime values that are not necessarily 
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identical; each resulting in different computed values for the system parameter. As a 
result, by the end of the simulation I could generate multiple values for the same 
system parameter with no way to determine which value to use to fulfill the 
availability requirement. 
 In the simplest case, if all downtimes were identical, the same value for the 
system parameter would have been generated at the conclusion of every downtime. 
To achieve this, I wish to select a single downtime value that is the maximum 
allowable downtime to meet a specific availability requirement, and then use this 
quantity as a constant downtime value that will fulfill the availability requirement at 
every point throughout the entire support life. To derive the maximum allowable 
downtime value, I have explored two scenarios. 
 The first scenario is illustrated in Figure 3.3a, where the first imposed 
downtime (DT1) duration is shorter than the second imposed downtime (DT2), where 
both downtimes have been imposed based on the same availability requirement. In 
this case, averaging the two downtimes would generate an average downtime 










(b)  DT1 > DT2
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Scenarios of downtimes requirement. 
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fulfilled at the end of DT1, equation (3.3); i.e., in this situation the maximum 
allowable downtime duration that the system can accommodate without failing to 
satisfy the availability requirement is constrained by the value of DT1. Therefore, DT2 













 The second scenario is illustrated in Figure 3.3b, where DT1 is larger than 
DT2. In this case, averaging the two downtimes would generate a DTAverage smaller 
than DT1, thus the availability requirement will be fulfilled at the end of DT1, 
equation (3.4). Also, notice that the availability requirement at any specific time 
includes all accumulated previous downtimes. Thus, when using the average value at 
the end of DT2, the availability requirement will still be satisfied, equation (3.5), since 
the accumulated averages are just the accumulated downtimes, i.e., summation of DT1 
and DT2.  Therefore, in this situation the maximum allowable downtime duration that 
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 Figure 3.4 summarizes both cases in one general case. The model imposes the 
required downtime to meet the availability requirement, and then it evaluates the 
current downtime with respect to the previous one. If the currently imposed downtime 
is larger than the previous one, then the model substitutes the current downtime value 
for the previous one. But if the currently imposed downtime is shorter than the 
previous one, then the model averages the current downtime value with all previous 
ones. The goal of this procedure is to generate one unique value of the maximum 
allowable downtime that meets the availability requirement. Note, during this 
procedure, the unknown system parameter that is determined based on the downtime 
requirement, gets updated as soon as the downtime values are updated.  
Time
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Figure 3.5. General case of updating uptime requirement. blank 
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 Note, if the unknown system parameters are explicitly generating the uptime, 
instead of the downtime, then, by analogy, I can use a similar procedure to impose 
and update the uptimes (Figure 3.5) to derive one unique value of the system 
parameters. In this case, I will derive the minimum allowable uptime that meets the 
availability requirement; then use the derived quantity to compute the corresponding 
system parameters. 
  
Solve for the Selected System Parameter 
 Once the final value of the downtime (or uptime) is imposed and updated, the 
selected unknown system parameter is solved for, using the relationship defined in 
section 3.5.2. Basically, this system parameter value was derived based on the 
specified availability requirement. 
 Finally, the design for availability model uses this final value of the selected 
system parameter that is necessary to meet the Ao requirement, to compute other 
quantities of interest (e.g., life cycle cost, investment cost, avoided failures, etc.). 
 
Parameters Affecting both Uptime and Downtime 
Determine the relationship between the known system parameters,  required 
availability and the selected unknown system parameter 
 When the selected unknown system parameter concurrently affects downtime 
and uptime, a relationship between the known system parameters, required 
availability and the selected unknown system parameter needs to be determined in 
order to solve for the unknown system parameter. 
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 In this case, I have three unknown quantities: 1) the unknown system 
parameter, 2) the downtime and 3) the uptime. Therefore, I need to establish three 
relationships to be able to solve for the three unknown quantities. Since this type of 
system parameters explicitly affects the uptime, therefore, the uptime could be 
expressed as a function of the unknown system parameter; this generates the first 
relationship. Similarly, the unknown system parameter explicitly affects the 
downtime, thus, downtime could be expressed as a function of the unknown system 
parameter; generating the second relationship. Also, availability is by definition a 
function of uptime and downtime; hence the third relationship. At this point, I have 
defined three relationships, with three unknowns (the unknown system parameter, the 
downtime and the uptime), thus I can solve for the unknown system parameter, 
uptime and downtime. 
 
Start with a guess of the selected system parameter, to initiate the simulation 
 In general, a closed-form analytical solution cannot be determined when 
solving for the unknown system parameter as a function of known quantities 
(availability requirement and other known system parameters), since the sequences of 
the accumulated event outcomes are only generated in real simulation time. Also, 
when modeling real complex systems, probabilistic models are usually used where 
quantities include uncertainties (probability distributions).  
 The event outcomes associated with the sampled values can only be 
accumulated by sampling the known quantities in real simulation time. Basically, an 
event outcome generated by the same known system parameter is not generally 
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repeated (i.e., it does not generally reoccur in an identical form at a regular interval). 
Each sample of the same quantity, i.e., system parameter, could result in a different 
event outcome, producing a different sequence of events and results for every system 
instance.  
 As a result of the situation described above, a conservative guess of the initial 
value of the selected unknown system parameter is required in order to launch the 
simulation, i.e., launch the sampling of the known quantities and accumulate the 
events outcomes. However, this guess is only used to initiate the simulation; it does 
not affect the final results of the analysis. 
 
Solve for the selected system parameter 
 The model uses the initial guessed value of the selected unknown system 
parameter to generate the first uptime and downtime values. Then, the unknown 
system parameter value is computed and updated, at the end of the first downtime, 
while accounting for the accumulated events type and duration. The same process is 
repeated at the end of every downtime. Basically, the selected unknown system 
parameter is solved for or imposed using the known system parameters and the 
availability requirement. 
 
Impose the selected system parameter requirement on the uptime and downtime 
 The computed system parameter value is used to compute and update the 
uptime and downtime values. Notice that the availability requirement was imposed 
through the selected system parameter, then the requirement has been transferred 
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through the selected system parameter to impose the uptime and downtime values that 
are necessary to meet the availability requirement. Once all quantities are computed 
and updated, the process continues forward in time to the next event. The same 
computational process is performed at the end of every downtime, until the timeline 
reaches the end of the system’s support life. 
 It is important to note that the described process is not iterative. Updating the 
unknown system parameter once at the end of every downtime is not the same as 
using multiple values of the unknown system parameter and continually iterating the 
entire process until the availability requirement is met. Because it is not iterative, it 
has the following advantages: computationally simple and straightforward, an exact 
solution could be determined, and a real-time assessment could be performed. 
 Finally, the model uses the updated selected system parameter, uptimes, and 




Chapter 4: Application of the Methodology 
The design for availability methodology described in Chapter 3 has been 
implemented within the maintenance ROI model described in Chapter 2, for 
demonstration and testing (i.e., verification). This chapter presents the application of 
the methodology to a case study example, to determine the necessary system 
parameters to meet a specific availability requirement. First, a derivation of the 
maximum allowable inventory lead time is presented as an example of determining 
system parameters affecting either uptime or downtime. Then a derivation of the 
minimum allowable system reliability is presented as an example of determining 
system parameters affecting both uptime and downtime. For both examples, a cost 
analysis of the system management using an unscheduled maintenance policy and a 
data-driven PHM approach is provided, this includes return on investment (ROI) and 
life cycle cost analysis. 
The maintenance ROI model, i.e., PHM ROI model, described in Chapter 2 is 
a discrete-event simulation that follows a population of sockets (a socket is an 
instance of an installation location for an LRU) through their lifetime from first line 
replaceable unit (LRU) installation in the socket to retirement of the socket. This is 
implemented as a Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation is a stochastic simulation 
of a timeline where specific events are added to the timeline and the resulting event 
order and timing can be used to analyze throughput, cost, availability (as an output), 
etc. 
The prediction of the remaining useful life (RUL) is determined by the 
sampling of both the time-to-failure (TTF) values and the distributions that are used 
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to model the effectiveness of a particular PHM approach. The sampling of the TTF 
values is defined differently for each PHM sustainment approach (e.g., data-driven, 
model-based, fixed interval scheduled maintenance and unscheduled maintenance) – 
see Chapter 2. The PHM ROI model includes the modeling of other quantities as well 
(e.g., operational profile, false positives, cost of money, inventory management, etc.). 
 
4.1. Case Study Data Inputs 
This section provides model inputs and assumptions that are used for the case 
study examples presented in this chapter.  The LRU used in this example is an 
avionics multifunction display (MFD). The implementation costs are summarized in 
Table 4.1. The discount rate on money used is 0.07.  
 
Table 4.1. Implementation Costs  
Frequency Type Value 
Recurring Costs 
Base cost of an LRU 
(without PHM) 
$25,000 per LRU 
Recurring Costs Recurring PHM cost 
$155 per LRU 
$90 per socket 
(CREC) 
Recurring Costs Annual Infrastructure 
$450 per socket 
(CINF) 
Non-Recurring Engineering PHM cost $700 per LRU (CNRE) 
  
 
The cost per hour out of service is $500 for scheduled maintenance and $5092 
for unscheduled maintenance assuming during mission failures. However, I assume 
that if the multifunction display (MFD) is not functional and the inventory is out of 
spares, thus the aircraft is grounded for more than 24 hours waiting for spares 
replenishment; then the value of an hour out of service drops to 10% of the cost of the 
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original aircraft being out of service. The operational profile is summarized in Table 
4.2 [42, 49], and a 20 years support life was chosen based on [50]. 
 
Table 4.2. Operational Profile 
Factor Multiplier Total 
Support life: 20 years 2,429 flights per year  
48,580 flights over 
support life 
7 flights per day 125 minutes per flight 
875 minutes in flight per 
day 
45 minutes turnaround 
between flights [51] 
6  preparation periods per day 
(between flights) 
270 minutes between 
flights per day 
 
 
4.2. Use of Design for Availability to Determine System Parameters Affecting 
either Uptime or Downtime 
Demonstration and Verification of the Methodology: Logistics (Inventory) 
Parameters 
In this section the design for availability methodology will be demonstrated 
for the derivation of the first type of system parameters, i.e., system parameters 
affecting either uptime or downtime (not both). An example for a logistics parameter 
derivation is presented. The objective in this case study example is to determine the 
appropriate spares replenishment lead time, i.e., inventory lead time (ILT), to fulfill a 
specific availability requirement.  In order to use this demonstration as a qualitative 
verification of the methodology, I will perform the following steps:  
• Using the availability distribution requirement as an input to the design for 
availability model, determine the required ILT distribution (output).  
• Use the generated ILT distribution as an input to the existing PHM ROI 
simulation (described in the introduction to this section) to predict an 
availability distribution as an output. 
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•  Compare the availability distribution input requirement to the availability 
distribution determined as an output.  
Notice that the first step is sufficient to achieve the design for availability task, 
since the ILT will be determined for a specific contract availability requirement. The 
second and third steps are for verification of the methodology. 
A detailed description of all of the case study inputs is provided in Section 
4.1, including LRU description, implementation and maintenance costs, and 
operational profile.  
The reliability information and inventory management parameters are 
provided in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3, respectively. Table 4.3 summarizes the spares 
inventory (per socket) assumptions that are used for this specific example. Also, note 
that the spares carrying costs are incorporated into the LRU recurring costs. Figure 
4.1 shows the assumed reliability for this case example, i.e., time-to-failure (TTF), of 
the LRU based on [43] and [52]. 
Table 4.3. Spares Inventory 
Factor Quantity 
Initial spares purchased for each 
socket 
5 
Threshold for spare replenishment ≤ 1 spares in the inventory per socket 
Number of spares to purchase per 
socket at replenishment 
4 
Spare replenishment lead time Solved for in this section case study 
Spares carrying cost 
10% of the beginning of year 
inventory value per year 
Billing due date when ordering 
additional spares 
2 years from purchase date 
 
To determine the appropriate ILT to ensure meeting a specific availability 
requirement I need to define a relationship between the downtime requirement and 
ILT. In this example, the ILT is the unknown system parameter, where ILT is the 
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amount of time it takes to receive replenishment spares (RS) when additional spares 
are ordered at the inventory spares threshold (ST) value (i.e., minimum quantity of 
held spares); this example case assumes that the inventory downtime (when the 
inventory runs out of spares, and the system is down waiting for replenishment 
spares) is larger than any concurrent maintenance downtime. Also, once the spares 
are received, the part can be immediately installed in the system. The ILT requires 
imposing a downtime requirement since varying the ILT only affects the downtime 
values, i.e., how long the system will be down waiting for spares to be replenished. 
In this case (Figure 4.2), the decision to impose the inventory downtime (IDT) 
to meet the availability requirement, instead of imposing uptime, is based on the fact 
that the unknown system parameter, i.e., ILT, is only dependent on the downtimes; 
and it is independent of the uptimes. Varying the ILT generates different IDT values; 
however the uptime values remain constant since they are only a function of the 
inventory spares threshold (ST) and maintenance downtimes (MDT). Where the 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  Weibull distribution of TTFs (β=1.1, η=200 and γ=9000). 
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inventory held spares is a function of the quantity of initial spares (IS) and quantity of 
RS. The ILT only defines the start of the next uptime, but it does not define the 
uptime duration. 
Because, the IDT is purely a function of ILT and spares threshold time (STT), 
where STT is the corresponding period of time to use all remaining spares; the IDT 
only depends on how low the inventory level is allowed to drop before ordering 
additional spares and how long it will take to receive those spares,  
1IDTSTTILT +=  (4.1) 
For this example I assume that the MDT are given and cannot be modified, 
i.e., the maintenance lead time, replacement time and repair time are already specified 
as inputs.  To fulfill the availability requirement at the end of the first IDT; IDT1 
should satisfy the Ao requirement (as defined in equation (1.1); where IS-MDT1 
corresponds to the accumulated uptime and IS+IDT1 corresponds to the sum of the 







1 -=       (4.2) 











Figure 4.2.  Implication of the inventory model parameters on the timeline. 
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Finally, the ILT is updated as the downtime requirement gets updated 
throughout the entire support life. Similar process is generally used to apply the 
approach to any system parameter that is explicitly related to either downtime or 
uptime, to fulfill a specific availability requirement. 
The availability distribution considered for this example case is shown in 
Figure 4.3.a. This distribution could represent the requirement of an availability 
contract. Note, availability contracts may specify the availability requirement as a 
single value, but, to accommodate more general problems, for all example cases I will 
use availability requirements that are represented as a probability distribution.  
Considering an availability requirement that is expressed as a probability 
distribution makes the process of determining the necessary system parameters to 
meet the availability requirement challenging, since every system instance could have 
a different availability requirement based on the sampled value from the probability 
distribution. Figure 4.4 shows the process used to generate a distribution of system 
parameter values using a discrete-event simulator (the PHM ROI model described 
earlier). The Monte Carlo implementation of the model samples the required 
availability distribution and other quantities that may be described as probability 
distributions, and then uses the quantities to solve for a value of the system parameter 
using the design for availability methodology. This process is repeated for each 
socket (a socket is an instance of an installation location for an LRU) in the 
population, resulting in histograms of system parameter values (e.g., ILTs). Figure 
4.3.b shows the ILT required to meet the availability requirement determined using 
the design for availability methodology. 
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In order to qualitatively verify the methodology, the maximum allowable ILT 
distribution (Figure 4.3.b) was used as an input to the PHM ROI model.  The PHM 
ROI model used the maximum allowable ILT distribution along with the other inputs 
(see Section 4.1) and generated a resulting availability distribution.  Figure 4.3.a 
shows the original availability input (mean = 97.19% and standard deviation = 
(a) (b) (c)
 
Figure 4.3. (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed maximum 
allowable Inventory Lead Time (ILT) in operational hours, for an unscheduled maintenance policy. 
(c) Availability probability distribution generated using the computed ILT (Figure 4.3.b). 
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Figure 4.4. Solution process. 
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0.51%), while Figure 4.3.c shows the availability prediction that resulted from the 
PHM ROI model (mean = 97.34% and standard deviation = 0.83%). The two results 
are not expected to be absolutely identical (since this is a stochastic solution), but the 
means and standard deviations are very similar. This simple example case validates 
the methodology and demonstrates qualitatively that the design for availability 
approach is truly satisfying the input availability requirement. 
 
Unscheduled Maintenance vs. Data-driven PHM 
 In this Section I compare the maximum allowable ILT for a specific 
availability requirement for unscheduled maintenance and a data-driven PHM 
approach.  
 Determining the maximum allowable ILT for a specific availability 
requirement could be used to improve logistics management and potentially reduce 
life cycle cost. If the availability drops below a specified threshold value, a cost 
penalty could be assessed; determining upfront the appropriate ILT could avoid these 
potential cost penalties. Also, knowing the maximum allowable ILT information, 
customers could require their suppliers to deliver within a specific lead time.  
 For the assumed set of system parameters and assumptions (see Section 4.1) I 
want to determine the appropriate spares replenishment lead time, i.e., inventory lead 
time (ILT), to fulfill the availability requirement specified in Figure 4.3a for an 
unscheduled maintenance approach and a data-driven PHM approach applied to the 
same system (a detailed explanation of how the data-driven PHM approach is 
modeled is provided in Section 2.3). 
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 Reducing the delivery time, i.e., ILT (considered as the only variable input in 
this example) would increase the availability. However, I also want to maximize the 
ILT to reduce the cost. Basically, I want to generate an optimal solution that produces 
the maximum allowable ILT (to minimize cost) that keeps the availability value at or 
above the availability requirement. 
 By running the simulation with the imposed availability (input) requirement 
shown in Figure 4.3.a, the ILT (output) satisfying this requirement was determined for 
the unscheduled maintenance policy, and the generated maximum allowable ILT 
probability distribution is shown in Figure 4.5, the light gray histogram bars (this 
distribution is the same as Figure 4.3.b).  
Maximum Allowable Inventory Lead Time – ILT (operational hours)
 
Figure 4.5. Computed maximum allowable inventory lead time (ILT) for unscheduled 
maintenance policy, and for a data-driven PHM approach. 
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 I now need to apply the methodology to the data-driven PHM approach.  
Figure 4.6 shows the results of the analysis to determine the optimal (lowest life cycle 
cost) prognostic distance for the data-driven PHM approach used; where the 
prognostic distance is defined as the measure (e.g., operational hours) of how long the 
prognostic structures or prognostic cell is expected to indicate failure, before the 
system actually fails (see Section 2.3). 
Small prognostic distances may miss failures while large prognostic distances 
may throw away significant remaining useful life. Each prognostic distance generates 
a corresponding ILT and life cycle cost. Note, the ILT values shown in Figure 4.6 are 
the mean values of the generated maximum allowable ILT distributions. Large 
prognostic distances may provide additional time to order spares ahead of failures; 
however, they could also produce solutions that require more spares, which will 

















































waiting for spares) since every delayed spares replenishment event generates an 
additional IDT. Therefore, to accommodate these downtimes, while fulfilling the 
availability requirement, the ILT has to be reduced (i.e., reduce the IDT, thus faster 
delivery). This is illustrated in Figure 4.6; where large prognostic distances generate 
shorter ILT. 
Using the input data (provided in Section 4.1) with the data-driven PHM 
approach, an optimal prognostic distance of 600 operational hours results in the 
minimum life cycle cost over the entire support life. Also, a symmetric triangular 
distribution with a width of 500 hours was assumed to represent the effectiveness of 
the data-driven PHM approach. 
After running the simulation with the imposed availability requirement shown 
in Figure 4.3.a, the maximum allowable ILT satisfying the contract requirement was 
determined, and the generated ILT probability distribution is shown in Figure 4.5 
(black histogram bars).  
In this example, the data-driven PHM approach allows for a larger ILT (mean 
= 13,936 operational hours), compared to the unscheduled maintenance case (mean = 
12,961 operational hours)11. In other words, using a data-driven PHM approach 
allows a given availability requirement to be met if ILTs are longer, or alternatively 
stated, the use of PHM would allow a supply chain with longer ILTs to be used. The 
use of a data-driven PHM approach has shifted the maximum allowable ILT 
distribution by approximately 1000 hours to the right. This result is due the fact that 
                                                 
11 The overlap area of ILT distributions in Figure 4.5 is negligible compared to the main distributions 
areas. This justifies the considerable difference (≈ 1,000 operational hours) in distributions’ mean 
values. Also, Figure 4.7 supports these results, since it shows that for the same ILT value an 




data-driven PHM has provided early warning of failures; therefore creating the 
opportunity to switch maintenance actions from unscheduled to scheduled events 
reducing the accumulated operational downtime. For a fixed ILT, this would result in 
an improved operational availability of the system. However, since in this problem 
the same availability requirement was imposed for both cases (unscheduled 
maintenance and data-driven PHM), thus the accumulated operational downtime was 
used as a fixed quantity (imposed by the contract availability requirement); then the 
avoided unscheduled maintenance downtime was added to the IDT, resulting in a 
larger allowed ILT. 
To summarize, the design for availability methodology was applied to the case 
study example described in Section 4.1, for two different maintenance approaches, to 
satisfy a specific contract availability requirement. For both approaches, unscheduled 
maintenance and data-driven PHM, I was able to determine the unknown system 
parameter (the maximum allowable ILT in this case) satisfying the availability 
requirement. Then a comparison of the results showed that data-driven PHM allows 
larger ILTs compared to the unscheduled maintenance policy case. 
Figure 4.7 shows how the maximum allowable ILT results could be practically 
interpreted. For example, if the ILT of each spares replenishment order is equal or 
greater than 12,700 operational hours, then the system manager would be 95% 
confident to meet the availability requirement under a data-driven PHM approach, 
and only 78% confident to meet the same availability requirement under an 
unscheduled maintenance approach. 
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Notice that, the application of the design for availability methodology doesn’t 
only determine the unknown system parameter (e.g., ILT) but also illustrates the 
effect of each adopted sustainment approach on the selected system parameter. In 
other words, for a specific PHM approach or any other maintenance policy, one could 
expect the variation of the selected system parameter, and react accordingly to 
maintain the availability requirement.    
 
Cost Analysis 
In the analysis described in this section, the PHM data-driven case produced 
lower life cycle cost (mean = $848,089) compared to the unscheduled maintenance 
case (mean = $1,241,238). This is due to the cost of purchasing additional spares 
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approaches generally require the minimum number of spares because the unscheduled 
maintenance events are performed upon the actual failure of the LRUs, thus 
maximizing the useful life of the LRUs. However, in this case, I have assumed that 
early warning of failures, in the data-driven PHM case, provides an opportunity to 
schedule and perform on-site maintenance events that resulted in repairing most 
LRUs, i.e., PHM provides the capability to intervene before a complete deterioration 
of the LRUs, resulting in replacing fewer LRUs (and thus ordering fewer spares). 
While in the unscheduled maintenance case, I assumed that all failures were resolved 
by replacing LRUs rather than repairing them. Since the PHM data-driven case 
required fewer spares, it required only one spare replenishment event (the large step 
in Figure 4.8.b); while the unscheduled maintenance case required more spares and 
three replenishment events (the three large steps in Figure 4.8.a). Also, for the PHM 
data-driven sustainment approach the billing due date for the spares replenishment 
events happened on a later date (~12th year in Figure 4.8.b) than the unscheduled 
maintenance case (~7th, 12th and 18th year in Figure 4.8.a), making the PHM data-
driven approach less costly because of the non-zero discount rate. 
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Note, the cost per hour out of service was the main cost driver for both cases, 
data-driven PHM and unscheduled maintenance; since the contract availability 
requirement value was relatively low (relatively large downtimes were allowed). The 
life cycle cost for both cases (data-driven PHM and unscheduled maintenance) would 
have been dramatically reduced for a higher availability requirement (e.g., 99.99%). 
 
Return on Investment (ROI) 
In this subsection, the return on investment (ROI) of a data-driven PHM 
approach relative to unscheduled maintenance is analyzed. The total life cycle cost 
per socket, for a data-driven PHM approach, was $848,089 (mean), with an effective 
investment cost per socket of $6,891 (mean), representing the cost of developing, 
supporting, and installing PHM. This cost was compared to the unscheduled 
maintenance approach, where the total life cycle cost per socket was $1,241,238 
(mean). Note that the investment cost for the unscheduled maintenance policy is by 
definition zero; since the ROI is computed to support an economic justification in 
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Figure 4.8.  Life cycle cost per socket for a 1000 socket population. (a) Life cycle cost per socket for 
an unscheduled maintenance. (b) Life cycle cost per socket for a data-driven PHM approach. 
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investing in PHM, as opposite to the unscheduled maintenance case where there is no 
investment (i.e., zero investment) in PHM. A detailed description of the methodology 
of determining ROI for PHM systems is provided in Section 2.9. 
Figure 4.9 shows the histogram of the computed ROI for 1000-socket 
population, using the inputs data provided in Section 4.1. In this example case, the 
computed mean ROI of investing in a data-driven PHM approach for the population 
of sockets was 57.0. This is a relatively large value of ROI, which is the result of the 
small PHM investment cost. Notice that some ROI values in Figure 4.9 become 
negative.  This means that there is a risk that implementing a data-driven PHM 
approach that meets the specified availability requirement for the system specified in 
Section 4.1, could result in an economic loss, i.e., I could end up being worse off than 
unscheduled maintenance.  Based on Figure 4.9, this example predicts that a data-










Standard Deviation = 38.36
Prob. of Negative ROIs = 6.1%
 
 
Figure 4.9. Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM relative to 
unscheduled maintenance that meets the availability requirement. 
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confidence. Notice that in this case the ROI was computed for a data-driven PHM 
relative to an unscheduled maintenance, with two different ILT distributions. An ILT 
distribution that was generated by a data-driven PHM to meet the availability 
requirement, and an ILT distribution that was generated by an unscheduled 
maintenance to meet the same availability requirement. 
Figure 4.10 shows the histogram of the computed ROI for 1000-socket 
population, for a data-driven PHM relative to an unscheduled maintenance policy 
using the same ILT distribution, which was generated to meet the availability 
requirement with a data-driven approach. In this case, the unscheduled maintenance 
approach does not meet the availability requirement.  The computed mean ROI of 
investing in a data-driven PHM approach for the population of sockets was 167.64. 
This larger ROI value is explained by the fact that the unscheduled maintenance case 
used larger values of ILT (which were generated by the data-driven PHM approach to 











Standard Deviation = 76.72
Prob. of Negative ROIs = 2.5%
 
 
Figure 4.10. Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM relative to 
unscheduled maintenance that uses an ILT distribution generated by the data-driven PHM. 
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4.3. Use of Design for Availability to Determine System Parameters Affecting 
both Uptime and Downtime 
Demonstration and Verification of the Methodology: Reliability (TTF) 
In this section, the objective of the application of the design for availability 
methodology is to determine the minimum12 allowable reliability, i.e., time-to-failure 
(TTF), of the LRUs that is necessary to meet the availability requirement. In this 
example case, the reliability of each LRU is represented by its TTF, where each TTF 
corresponds to the period of time until the occurrence of the next actual failure. 
TTF is used as an example to demonstrate the application of the methodology 
to system parameters concurrently affecting both uptime and downtime. For example, 
consider the following scenario (which illustrates how TTF could concurrently affect 
both uptime and downtime): the replenishment spares will be delivered one year from 
now for a specific inventory, while this inventory is currently out of spares. The 
system (the socket), that is drawing spares from this specific inventory as needed, will 
be up and running as long as the currently used spare by the system doesn’t require 
replacement, thus the system uptime is dependent on the TTF of this spare. Also, the 
system downtime could be minimized if the spare being used does not require 
replacement until the replenishment spares are delivered (e.g., one year from now). 
However, as soon as the spare requires replacement, the system will be down until 
additional spares are received. Thus, the system downtime is dependent on the TTF of 
                                                 
12 The required availability distribution and other quantities (inputs) that may be described as 
probability distributions, are sampled and used to solve for a single value of TTF. This value represents 
the minimum TTF value (minimum allowable reliability) that is necessary to meet the sampled 
required availability in the environment defined by the sampled values of all the other input quantities. 
This process is repeated for each socket in the population, resulting in a histogram of minimum 
allowable TTFs.  Each individual in the histogram represents one socket in the population of sockets 
under one possible set of life cycle conditions. This solution process was illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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this spare. This simple scenario demonstrates how the TTF of the LRUs could affect 
both the uptime and downtime. Notice that a detailed discussion and assumptions of 
the spares management model is provided in Section 2.6.  
To demonstrate and verify the derivation of the TTF for a specific availability 
requirement, the design for availability methodology has been implemented within 
the PHM ROI model.  
In order to use the application of the methodology on TTF as a qualitative 
verification of the methodology, I will perform the same verification process steps as 
used with system parameters affecting either uptime or downtime. This means, first, 
using the availability distribution requirement as an input, determine the distribution 
of the minimum allowable TTF. Then, for verification purposes, use the generated 
TTF distribution as an input to the existing PHM ROI simulation to predict an 
availability distribution as an output. Finally, compare the availability distribution 
input requirement to the availability distribution determined as an output – they 
should be equivalent.  
A detailed description of all of the case study inputs is provided in Section 
4.1, including LRU description, implementation and maintenance costs, and 
operational profile.  
The reliability information is not provided, since in this example case the 
reliability (TTF) is the selected unknown system parameter being solved for. The 
inventory management parameters are provided in Table 4.4, which summarizes the 
spares inventory (per socket) assumptions that are used for this specific example. 
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Also, note that the spares carrying costs are incorporated into the LRU recurring 
costs.  
Table 4.4. Spares Inventory 
Factor Quantity 
Initial spares purchased for each 
socket 
3 
Threshold for spare replenishment ≤ 1 spares in the inventory per socket 
Number of spares to purchase per 
socket at replenishment 
2 
Spare replenishment lead time 18 calendar months 
Spares carrying cost 
10% of the beginning of year 
inventory value per year 
Billing due date when ordering 
additional spares 
2 years from purchase date 
 
Both, the TTF values and the distributions modeling the effectiveness of a 
particular PHM approach are used to predict the remaining useful life (RUL) of the 
LRUs (see Chapter 2). For each PHM sustainment approach (e.g., data-driven, model-
based – also known as physics of failure, fixed-interval scheduled maintenance and 
unscheduled maintenance), the sampling of the TTF values is defined differently. The 
sampled TTF values are used to predict the maintenance events and to determine 
whether the selected PHM approach detected (or failed to detect) a failure. 
In the unscheduled maintenance case, the sampling of the TTF values predict 
the date of the next maintenance event associated with a failure of a system instance. 
Spares are drawn from the inventory as needed to support maintenance. Once the 
inventory reaches a threshold value, additional spares are ordered, and the 
replenishment spares are delivered after a delivery lead time. Figure 4.11 illustrates 
this scenario, where MDT is maintenance downtime, ILT is the inventory lead time, 
ST is the spares threshold (once the inventory level drops below this value, additional 
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spares are ordered), and IDT is inventory downtime (when the inventory runs out of 
spares, and the system is down waiting for spares). 
Notice that the accumulated uptime (UT) accounts for all system’s uptimes. 
This includes the system’s uptime while using the inventory initial spares (IS) and the 
system’s uptime while using inventory replenishment spares (RS). The RS could be 
ordered multiple times as needed, 
( )( ) ( )( )
∑∑ += TTFRSTTFISUT  (4.3) 
The accumulated downtime (DT) includes the maintenance downtime (MDT) 
and the inventory downtime (IDT),  
( )( )( )
∑ ∑∑∑ ∑ +=+= MDTTTFST-ILTMDTIDTDT   (4.4) 
Notice that the summations in equations (4.3) and (4.4) do not necessarily 
refer to the analytical summations, but to the accumulation of events. Since these 
relationships are based on the accumulation of the event outcomes and sequences, 
that are only determined in real simulation time. Also, the model is probabilistic, this 
means each sample of the same quantity, i.e., system parameter, could result in a 
different event outcome. A detailed explanation is provided in Section 3.6. 
The operational availability is, by definition, the accumulated uptime over the 



















Ao   (4.5) 
 
where UT is the accumulated uptime and DT is the accumulated downtime. 
For example, the kth TTF value could be derived by combining equations 
(4.3), (4.4) and (4.5). The kth TTF corresponds to the kth downtime, where the kth 
downtime could be a maintenance downtime, inventory downtime, or any other 
logistics downtime. Once again, the summations in equation (4.6) do not refer to 
analytical summations, but to the accumulation of events outcomes and sequences. 












k     (4.6) 
Notice that equations (4.3)-(4.6) could be slightly different for each problem 
set up or model. The modeling of the operational timeline illustrated in this section is 
by no means unique. However, different models could provide different equations, 
but, the steps of the procedure remain the same. Thus, the application of the design 
for availability methodology is general and could be apply to any problem, 
independently of the setup of these equations.   
After every downtime, the TTF is computed using the procedure described 
above. However, the methodology derives the minimum allowable TTF that is 
necessary to meet the availability requirement. Figure 4.12 illustrates the process of 
updating the computed TTFs. Basically, after every downtime, the computed TTF is 
compared to the previous value, if the current value is greater than the previous one, 
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then the current value is substituted for the previous value. But if the current value is 
less than the previous one, then the current one is used. Once, the current TTF value 
is updated, this new TTF requirement is imposed on the uptime and downtime values 
through equations (4.3) and (4.4). Finally, the model uses the updated TTFs, UTs, and 
DTs to compute other quantities of interest. 
While considering an availability requirement that is expressed as a 
probability distribution is more realistic, it makes the process of determining the 
necessary system parameters to meet the availability requirement challenging, since 
every system instance could have a different availability requirement based on the 
sampled value from the probability distribution. Figure 4.4 shows the process used to 
generate a distribution of system parameter values using a discrete event simulator 
(the PHM ROI model described earlier).  
Time




If TTFk > TTFk-1 If TTFk < TTFk-1
1k-k =TTFTTF updated
Update UT and DT Update UT and DT
 
 
Figure 4.12.  Updating the TTFs, UTs and DTs. 
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The availability requirement considered in this example case, for an 
unscheduled maintenance policy, is shown in Figure 4.13.a. This availability 
requirement has been used as an input to the design for availability model. Figure 
4.13.b show the resulting TTF distribution. The TTF distribution was generated 
through the process illustrated in Figure 4.4 and using the input data provided in 
Section 4.1.  
In order to qualitatively verify the methodology, the TTF distribution (Figure 
4.13.b) was used as an input to the PHM ROI model, while using an unscheduled 
maintenance approach. The PHM ROI model used the TTF distribution along with 
the other data inputs and generated a resulting availability distribution. Figure 4.13.c 
shows the availability prediction that resulted from the PHM ROI model. The two 
availability distributions (Figures 4.13.a and 4.13.c) are not expected to be absolutely 
identical (since this is a stochastic solution), but the means and standard deviations 
are very similar. This qualitatively validates the design for availability model. 
(a) (b) (c)  
 
Figure 4.13. (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed minimum 
allowable reliability (TTF) in operational hours, for an unscheduled maintenance policy. (c) 
Availability probability distribution generated using the computed TTF (Figure 4.13.b). 
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Unscheduled Maintenance vs. Data-Driven PHM Approach 
A detailed description of the inputs data used for this example is provided in 
Section 4.1. For this example case study the optimal data-driven PHM prognostic 
distance was determined by selecting the prognostic distance resulting in a minimum 
life cycle cost. Where the prognostic distance is defined as the measure of how long 
the prognostic structure or prognostic cell is expected to indicate failure before the 
system actually fails (see Section 2.3). This analysis has resulted an optimal 
prognostic distance of 600 operational hours (see Figure 4.14). 
For each prognostic distance there is a corresponding minimum allowable 
TTF distribution and life cycle cost distribution (see Figure 4.14). However, the TTF 
and life cycle cost values shown on Figure 4.14 are the means of the generated TTF 









0 200 400 600 800 1000










































































Life Cycle Cost (M$)
Reliability (TTF)
Optimum prognostic 
distance = 600 hours
)
 
Figure 4.14. Variations of life cycle cost and minimum allowable reliability (TTF) with data-
driven PHM prognostic distance. 
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Small prognostic distances maximize the LRUs useful life, but result more 
unanticipated failures (more unscheduled maintenance events, i.e., expensive and 
larger maintenance time), thus, potentially increasing the maintenance downtime. 
Consequently, they require larger TTFs to produce larger uptime durations, since the 
pre-imposed uptime-downtime relationship has to be maintained in order to satisfy 
the availability requirement. In this case, the life cycle cost is increased because of the 
cost of the unscheduled maintenance, i.e., unanticipated failures.  
On the other hand, large prognostic distances throw away considerable 
remaining useful life of the LRUs. Thus, increase the number of spares drawn from 
inventory and spares sent to the repair process, and potentially increase the inventory 
downtime. However, more failures are avoided (more scheduled maintenance, i.e., 
less expensive and shorter maintenance time). Similarly, to maintain the uptime-
downtime relationship defined by the availability requirement, larger TTFs are 
required. In this case, the life cycle cost is increased by the cost of the repair process 
and inventory downtime. 
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The availability requirement considered in this subsection is shown on Figure 
4.13.a. This availability requirement has been used as an input to the design for 
availability model. Figure 4.15 show the resulting TTF distributions using 
unscheduled maintenance and data-driven PHM, in light grey and black colors 
respectively. The TTF distributions were generated through the process illustrated in 
Figure 4.4 and using the input data provided in Section 4.1. 
By comparing the resulting TTF distributions for unscheduled maintenance 
and data-driven PHM approaches (Figure 4.15), data-driven PHM has allowed a 
lower TTF requirement. This means, in this example case, using a data-driven PHM 
approach relaxes (relative to unscheduled maintenance) the required TTF to meet the 
TTF
 
Figure 4.15. Computed minimum allowable reliability (TTF) distribution for 
unscheduled maintenance and data-driven PHM. 
 81 
 
imposed availability requirement. This is a powerful result from the design for 
availability methodology, since the methodology doesn’t only derive the necessary 
system parameters for a specific availability requirement, but it also reflects the 
impact of a PHM approach on the selected system parameters, thus, providing a better 
understanding of the relationship of a PHM implementation and the system 
parameters. Also, the methodology emphasizes the fact that a PHM implementation 
selection should incorporate all design, support and logistics parameters. In other 
words, based on the design, support, or logistics management, one PHM approach 
could be more feasible than the other.  
Predicting the TTF distribution could be used to avoid the contract availability 
penalties, since a cost penalty could be assessed for not fulfilling the availability 
requirement specified in the contract. Also, the minimum allowable TTF information 
could be used to define requirements and provide feedback to the design process, 
since it is more expensive to design LRUs with larger TTFs. Finally, explicitly 
expressing the TTF distribution could be used to predict and understand the system’s 
behavior.  
Figure 4.16 shows how the TTF results could be practically interpreted. For 
example, if the reliability (TTF) of each LRU is equal or greater than 9,000 
operational hours, then the system manager would be 87% confident to meet the 
availability requirement under if a data-driven PHM approach is used, and only 8% 






Figure 4.17 represents the accumulation of the life cycle cost per socket for 
both the data-drive PHM and unscheduled maintenance case. The data-driven PHM 
case resulted in an overall lower life cycle cost (mean = $1,973,625) compared to the 
unscheduled maintenance case (mean = $2,469,334). In this example, the data-driven 
PHM approach case required fewer spares throughout the support life of the system, 
compared to the unscheduled maintenance policy case. This result is due to the ability 
to repair versus replace. 
 




In the data-driven PHM sustainment approach case the billing due date for the 
initial and most spare replenishment events occurred on a later date than the 
unscheduled maintenance case, therefore the cost of purchasing additional spares was 
smaller because due to the discount rate on money. The annual steps seen in Figure 
4.17, are relatively larger for the data-driven PHM approach, because: more spares 
are held in the inventory (higher annual spares carrying cost), expensive spares (PHM 
recurring costs are added to LRU purchase price) and PHM infrastructure costs are 
annually accumulated. Finally, notice that the total accumulated downtime is constant 
for both cases (imposed by the availability requirement); this explains the small steps 
in Figure 4.17 for unscheduled maintenance case during the replenishment events at 
approximately years 4, 7, 9, etc. (frequent short, i.e., less expensive, inventory 
downtimes), compared to the data-driven PHM case large steps at approximately 
years 7, 12 and 17 (less frequent longer, i.e. expensive, inventory downtimes). On the 
other hand, the maintenance downtimes generated by the unscheduled maintenance 
case have been larger (unanticipated and unscheduled events) compared to the 
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Figure 4.17. (a) Life cycle cost per socket for an unscheduled maintenance policy. (b) Life cycle cost 
per socket for a data-driven PHM approach. 
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maintenance downtimes generated by the data-driven PHM case (anticipated and 
scheduled events). 
This cost analysis could have been even more favorable to the data-driven 
PHM case, since in this example case I did not include the modeling of the cost 
associated with improving an LRU’s reliability, i.e., TTF. Figure 4.15 shows that, in 
this example, the unscheduled maintenance case required larger TTFs compared to 
the data-driven PHM case to meet the same availability requirement (Figure 4.13.a). 
Thus, if the cost of improving TTFs was included, then the larger TTFs requirement 
in the unscheduled maintenance case would have cost more, resulting in a larger life 
cycle cost for the unscheduled maintenance approach. 
 
Return on Investment (ROI) 
In this subsection, the return on investment (ROI) of a data-driven PHM 
approach relative to unscheduled maintenance is analyzed. The total life cycle cost 
per socket, for a data-driven PHM approach, was $1,973,625 (mean), with an 
effective investment cost per socket of $6,749 (mean), representing the cost of 
developing, supporting, and installing PHM. This cost was compared to the 
unscheduled maintenance approach, where the total life cycle cost per socket was 
$2,469,334 (mean). Note that the investment cost for the unscheduled maintenance 
policy is by definition zero; since the ROI is computed to support an economic 
justification in investing in PHM, as opposite to the unscheduled maintenance case 
where there is no investment (i.e., zero investment) in PHM. A detailed description of 
the methodology of determining ROI for PHM systems is provided in Section 2.9. 
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Figure 4.18 shows the histogram of the computed ROI for 1000-socket 
population, using the inputs data provided in Section 4.1. In this example case, the 
computed mean ROI of investing in a data-driven PHM approach for the population 
of sockets was 71.23. This is relatively a large value of ROI, which is justified by the 
small PHM investment cost. Notice that some ROI values in Figure 4.18 become 
negative.  This means that there is a risk that implementing a data-driven PHM 
approach that meets the specified availability requirement for the system specified in 
Section 4.1, could result in an economic loss, i.e., I could end up being worse off than 
unscheduled maintenance.  Based on Figure 4.18, this example predicts that a data-
driven PHM approach would result in a positive ROI (cost benefit) with an 87.3% 
confidence. 
Notice that in this case the ROI was computed for a data-driven PHM relative 










Standard Deviation = 65.91
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Figure 4.18. Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM relative 
to unscheduled maintenance that meets the availability requirement. 
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different TTF distribution - TTF distribution that was generated by a data-driven 
PHM to meet the availability requirement, and a TTF distribution that was generated 
by an unscheduled maintenance to meet the same availability requirement. 
Figure 4.19 shows the histogram of the computed ROI for 1000-socket 
population, for a data-driven PHM relative to an unscheduled maintenance policy 
using the same TTF distribution, which was generated to meet the availability 
requirement with a data-driven approach. The computed mean ROI of investing in a 
data-driven PHM approach for the population of sockets was 203.24. This larger ROI 
value is explained by the fact that the unscheduled maintenance case used shorter 












Standard Deviation = 59.45
Prob. of Negative ROIs = 0.4%
 
 
Figure 4.19. Histogram of ROI for a 1000-socket population, for a data-driven PHM relative to 
unscheduled maintenance that uses a TTF distribution generated by a data-driven PHM. 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Contributions 
5.1. Summary 
In this dissertation a new methodology for determining unknown system 
parameters to fulfill a specific availability requirement has been presented. The 
design for availability methodology is not a “search-based” approach and is capable 
of calculating unknown system parameters directly from the availability requirement 
even when the inputs (e.g., design and support parameters) are uncertain and the 
availability requirement is represented as a probability distribution.   
Case study examples were presented to demonstrate the methodology, as well 
as providing a means for verification and qualitative validation purposes. Case study 
results for an example system managed using both unscheduled maintenance and a 
data-driven PHM approach were also included.  The model predicted a larger 
allowable ILT for the data-driven PHM case for the same availability requirement. 
The conclusions in this dissertation about the ILT associated with PHM and 
unscheduled maintenance approaches are specific to the example data assumed and 
should not be interpreted as a general conclusion.  However, the example 
demonstrates that the use of PHM, in cases where availability requirements are 
imposed, can provide value beyond the commonly articulated failure avoidance and 
minimization of lost remaining useful life. 
The determination of ILT for a specific availability requirement was provided 
as a demonstration of the design for availability methodology operation; where the 
ILT was used as an example of system parameters affecting either uptime or 
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downtime. The methodology can be applied to determine any system parameters that 
can be explicitly related to the timeline downtimes or uptimes, for a contract 
availability requirement. 
A demonstration of the derivation of the reliability (TTF), as a parameter 
affecting both uptime and downtime, is provided. The demonstration shows how the 
minimum reliability of a system or subsystem could be determined, to meet a specific 
availability requirement. This reliability information could be crucial to availability 
contracts and to any system with high availability requirement. 
The reliability analysis, for a data-driven PHM approach versus an 
unscheduled maintenance approach, shows that the computed minimum reliability to 
meet a specific availability requirement is explicitly dependent on the PHM approach 
used to maintain the system. The analysis also shows that each PHM approach 
produces a different life cycle cost. Basically, for the same availability requirement a 
system would require different reliability management based on the adopted 
maintenance policy. The design for availability application results demonstrate not 
only deriving the system parameters that are necessary to meet a specific availability 
requirement, but also provide a critical tool to understand the impact of a PHM 
implementation on each system parameter. In the case study examples, the PHM data-
driven case has produced a lower life cycle cost compared to the unscheduled 
maintenance case. This is caused by: 1) the ability to repair versus replace, 2) the 
number of spares required to support the system, and 3) the discount rate on money. 
The cost analysis reflects the complexity of a true understanding of a PHM 
implementation and its impact on the life cycle management of the system. Only by 
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adopting a complete approach that takes into consideration all system design, support 




The research work presented in this dissertation makes the following 
contributions: 
1) Creation of the first general “design for availability” methodology that is 
not a “search-based” method and is capable of calculating unknown 
system parameters directly from an availability requirement when the 
inputs are uncertain and the availability requirement is represented as a 
probability distribution. 
a. The new methodology was demonstrated on system parameters 
affecting either downtime or uptime, e.g., logistics parameters. 
b. The new methodology was demonstrated on system parameters 
affecting both uptime and downtime, e.g., reliability. 
2) Integration of the design for availability method into the process of 
designing PHM into systems.  This integration provides a key means to 
quantify application-specific PHM implementation impacts on specific 
system parameters – a capability that has not been previously available 
3) Creation of a methodology for performing life cycle cost (and ROI) 
versus availability tradeoffs for systems that incorporate PHM.  This 
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dissertation is the first reported work to quantitatively produce life cycle 
cost (and ROI) versus availability for systems that incorporate PHM. 
5.3. Potential Broader Impacts of this Work 
The design for availability methodology, applied to PHM systems, provides 
the possibility for significant new capability to: a) perform (in conjunction with 
prognostics and health management) real-time pro-active availability analysis; b) 
determine requirements flow down for the development of prognostics and system 
health management and flow down to the supply chain; and c) perform pro-active 
reliability versus logistics tradeoffs, and assess the cost and resources required to 
deliver and support systems subject to availability contracts (e.g., Performance-Based 
Logistics contracts). 
This method will enable the use of advances in the detection of performance 
anomalies and degradation of systems (including prognostics), to assess (and 
mitigate) logistics risks that result in system downtime.  Providing health assessment 
and advanced warning of impending failure coupled with real-time design for 
availability control enables decision support actions that when communicated to 
maintenance and logistics operations will insure timely forecasting of maintenance 
and logistics actions that meet required availability levels, while providing valuable 
feedback to the design process. 
The methodology is part of a disciplined supportability analysis strategy that 
could be applied early in the system development process, thus exerting influence on 
the system (and system supportability) design by suggesting where appropriate PHM 
monitors and data collection mechanisms should be included in the design.   
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5.4. Future Work 
Future work could extend the design for availability methodology to address 
the concurrent determination of multiple system parameters that are dependent, i.e., if 
a relationship between the unknown system parameters is known. However, when the 
unknown system parameters are independent, the inclusion of an optimization 
approach may be required; since the relationship between the imposed downtime (or 
uptime) and the unknown system parameters could accept more than one unique 
solution. But, even in this case (i.e., multiple independent system parameters), the 
methodology is still efficient in terms of reducing the large and complex optimization 
problem, i.e., determining the unknown system parameters for multiple non-identical 
downtime (or uptime) values that generate different availability quantities, which may 
or may not satisfy the availability requirement; to determining the unknown system 
parameters for a single downtime (or uptime) value that has been imposed to satisfy 
the availability requirement.  
The work presented in this dissertation could be extended by the inclusion of a 
redundancy analysis. In other words, analyze cases where a unit’s failure does not 
necessarily generate an operational downtime of the system, since other redundant 
units could substitute the failed unit and maintain the ordinary operation of the 
system, while the failed unit is being repaired or replaced. This will directly affect the 
availability of the system (i.e., improve the availability), since the downtime duration 
will be reduced because of the immediate accessibility to the redundant units. 
Therefore, the design for availability derivation process, to determine the unknown 
system parameters, will be different for systems with redundant units. 
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This dissertation is focused on availability contracts that consist of meeting an 
operational availability requirement; this is indeed the general case (i.e., operational 
availability). Since the operational availability is the actual system availability that 
the customer sees, it implicitly incorporates other forms of availability and it is the 
most commonly used form of availability in this type of contracts. However, future 
work could extend the design for availability methodology to incorporate other types 
of availability (e.g., instantaneous, mean, steady-state, inherent and achieved). The 
main difference between these forms of availability is the type of activities that are 
excluded or included in the accumulated downtime and uptime values. This means 
when applying the design for availability methodology, using the same system design 
and support parameters to meet a specific availability requirement, the imposed 
downtimes and uptimes requirement is going to be different based on the considered 
type of availability. 
A conservative approach has been adopted, since the availability requirement 
was satisfied at any time during the entire system’s life. Future work could consider 
satisfying the availability requirement at specific time periods. Since different 
contracts could define an availability requirement over different periods of time. In 
this case, the application of the methodology would be similar to the conservative 
case (i.e., satisfying the availability requirement at all times), with the difference of 
imposing the uptime and downtime requirements at a contract-specified periods of 






This Appendix presents additional example cases for the demonstration and 
verification of the design for availability methodology. 
The design for availability methodology will be demonstrated for the 
derivation of two different logistics parameters: 1) spares threshold (ST) and 2) 
replenishment spares (RS). Where ST is the minimum quantity of held spares, and RS 
is the number of replenishment spares ordered at the at ST value. Similar to Chapter 
4, in order to use this demonstration as a qualitative verification of the methodology, I 
will perform the following steps:  
• Using the availability distribution requirement as an input to the design for 
availability model, determine the required ST distribution (output).  
• Use the generated ST distribution as an input to the existing PHM ROI 
simulation (described in the introduction to this section) to predict an 
availability distribution as an output. 
•  Compare the availability distribution input requirement to the availability 
distribution determined as an output.  
Notice that the first step is sufficient to achieve the design for availability task, 
since the ST will be determined for a specific contract availability requirement. The 
second and third steps are for verification of the methodology. The same three-step 
process is adopted for the demonstration and verification of the methodology applied 
to the RS. A detailed description of how ST and RS affect the operational timeline is 





All case study inputs are provided in Section 4.1, including LRU description, 
implementation and maintenance costs, and operational profile.  
The reliability information and inventory management parameters are 
provided in Figure A.1 and Table A.1, respectively. Table A.1 summarizes the spares 
inventory (per socket) assumptions that are used for this specific example. Also, note 
that the spares carrying costs are incorporated into the LRU recurring costs. Figure 
A.1 shows the assumed reliability for this case example, i.e., time-to-failure (TTF), of 





Figure A.1.  Weibull distribution of TTFs (β=1.1, η=200 and γ=9000). 
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Table A.1. Spares Inventory 
Factor Quantity 
Initial spares purchased for each 
socket 
4 
Threshold for spare replenishment Solved for in this section case study 
Number of spares to purchase per 
socket at replenishment 
3 
Spare replenishment lead time 27 calendar months 
Spares carrying cost 
10% of the beginning of year 
inventory value per year 
Billing due date when ordering 
additional spares 
2 years from purchase date 
 
The availability distribution considered for this example case is shown in 
Figure A.2.a. This distribution could represent the requirement of an availability 
contract. Note, availability contracts may specify the availability requirement as a 
single value, but, to accommodate more general problems, for all example cases I will 
use availability requirements that are represented as a probability distribution.  
Figure A.2.b shows the ST required to meet the availability requirement 
determined using the design for availability methodology. 
(a) (b) (c)  
 
Figure A.2. (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed spares threshold 
(ST), for a data-driven PHM approach. (c) Availability probability distribution generated using the 
computed ST (Figure A.2.b). 
 96 
 
In order to qualitatively verify the methodology, the spares threshold ST 
distribution (Figure A.2.b) was used as an input to the PHM ROI model.  The PHM 
ROI model used the spares threshold ST distribution along with the other inputs (see 
Section 4.1) and generated a resulting availability distribution.  Figure A.2.a shows 
the original availability input (mean = 89.47% and standard deviation = 0.74%), 
while Figure A.2.c shows the availability prediction that resulted from the PHM ROI 
model (mean = 89.51 and standard deviation = 0.77). The two results are not expected 
to be absolutely identical (since this is a stochastic solution), but the means and 
standard deviations are very similar. This simple example case validates the 
methodology and demonstrates qualitatively that the design for availability approach 
is truly satisfying the input availability requirement. 
 
Replenishment Spares 
All case study inputs are provided in Section 4.1, including LRU description, 
implementation and maintenance costs, and operational profile.  
The reliability information and inventory management parameters are 
provided in Figure A.1 and Table A.2, respectively. Table A.2 summarizes the spares 
inventory (per socket) assumptions that are used for this specific example. Also, note 
that the spares carrying costs are incorporated into the LRU recurring costs. Figure 







Table A.2. Spares Inventory 
Factor Quantity 
Initial spares purchased for each 
socket 
3 
Threshold for spare replenishment ≤ 1 spares in the inventory per socket 
Number of spares to purchase per 
socket at replenishment 
Solved for in this section case study 
Spare replenishment lead time 36 calendar months 
Spares carrying cost 
10% of the beginning of year 
inventory value per year 
Billing due date when ordering 
additional spares 
2 years from purchase date 
 
The availability distribution considered for this example case is shown in 
Figure A.3.a. This distribution could represent the requirement of an availability 
contract. Note, availability contracts may specify the availability requirement as a 
single value, but, to accommodate more general problems, for all example cases I will 
use availability requirements that are represented as a probability distribution.  
Figure A.3.b shows the ST required to meet the availability requirement 





Figure A.3. (a) Required availability distribution (input to the model). (b) Computed replenishment 
spares (RS), for an unscheduled maintenance policy. (c) Availability probability distribution 
generated using the computed RS (Figure A.3.b). 
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In order to qualitatively verify the methodology, the replenishment spares RS 
distribution (Figure A.3.b) was used as an input to the PHM ROI model.  The PHM 
ROI model used the replenishment spares RS distribution along with the other inputs 
(see Section 4.1) and generated a resulting availability distribution.  Figure A.3.a 
shows the original availability input (mean = 63.88% and standard deviation = 
0.83%), while Figure A.3.c shows the availability prediction that resulted from the 
PHM ROI model (mean = 63.85 and standard deviation = 0.76). The two results are 
not expected to be absolutely identical (since this is a stochastic solution), but the 
means and standard deviations are very similar. This simple example case validates 
the methodology and demonstrates qualitatively that the design for availability 






[1] D. Kececioglu, Maintainability, Availability, Operational Readiness, Engineering Handbook, 
Volume 1, Prentice Hall PTR, 1995. 
 
[2] F. E. Oliveto, “An Optimal Sparing Model for the Operational Availability to Approach the 
Inherent Availability,” in Proceedings of the Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2001, 
pp. 252-257. 
 
[3] Y. Macheret, P. Koehn, and D. Sparrow, “Improving reliability and operational availability of 
military systems,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2005. 
 
[4] I. C. L. Ng, R. Maull, and N. Yip, “Outcome-based Contracts as a driver for Systems thinking and 
Service-Dominant Logic in Service Science: Evidence from the Defence industry”, European 
Management Journal, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 377-387, December 2009. 
 
[5] BAE 61972 BAE Annual Report (2008). 
 
[6] R. L. Beanum, “Performance - Based logistics and contractor support methods,” in Proceedings of 
the  IEEE Systems Readiness Technology Conference (AUTOTESTCON), September 2006. 
 
[7] W. A. Hyman, “Performance-based contracting for maintenance,” NCHRP Synthesis 389, 
ISSN:0547-5570, 2009. 
 
[8] M. Pecht, Product Maintainability Supportability Handbook, 2nd Edition, CRC Press, 2009. 
 
[9] M. G. Pecht, Prognostics and Health Management of Electronics, Wiley-Interscience, September 
2008. 
 
[10] S. V. Amari and L. McLaughlin, “Optimal design of a condition-based maintenance model”, 
Reliability and Maintainability, 2004 Annual Symposium – RAMS, pp. 528-533, January 2004. 
 
[11] F. Nilsson, J. Waidringer, “Toward Adaptive Logistics Management,” Proceedings of the 38th 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, pp. 81c, January 2005. 
 
 
[12]  E. C. Mercado, Hands-On Inventory Management, Auerbach Publications, 2007. 
 
[13] B. Hruz and M. C. Zhou, Modeling and Control of Discrete-Event Dynamic Systems, Springer, 
2007. 
 
[14] G. S. Fishman, Discrete-Event Simulation: Modeling, Programming, and Analysis, Springer, 
2001. 
 
[15] M. Bazargan and R. N. McGrath, “Discrete event simulation to improve aircraft availability and 
maintainability,” in Proceedings of the Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2003, pp. 
63-67. 
 
[16] L. Yin, R. M. Fricks, and K. S. Trivedi, Application of Semi-Markov Process and CTMC to 
Evaluation of UPS System Availability, in Proceedings of the Annual Reliability and Maintainability 




[17] P. Choonhapran and G. Balzar, Availability of HV Circuit-Breakers: The Application of Markov 
Model, in Proceedings of the Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2007. 
 
[18] T. DelSole, A Fundamental Limitation of Markov Models, Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences, 
Vol. 57, pp. 2158-2168, 2000. 
 
[19] A. S. Noetzel, The Reduction of a Discrete Event Simulation to a Markov Chain, Proceedings of 
the Winter Simulation Conference, Dec. 1979, pp. 391-397. 
 
[20] J. R. Clymer, Simulation-Based Engineering of Complex Systems, Wiley-Inter-Science, 2nd 
Edition, 2009. 
 
[21] Y. Min, H. Zhengyou, and Q. Qingquan, Fuzzy Availability Based on Affine Arithmetic and 
Markov Process, in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Intelligent Computation 
Technology and Automation, 2009, pp. 704-707. 
 
[22] A. Wood, Availability Calculations with Exhaustible Spares, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 
Vol. 38, No. 3, 1989, pp. 388-391. 
 
[23] (Yang and Nachlas 2001) S-C. Yang and J. A. Nachlas, Bivariate Reliability and Availability 
Modeling, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2001, pp. 26-35. 
 
[24] O. O. Bankole, R. Roy, E. Shehab, P. Wardle, Affordability Assessment of Industrial Product-
Service System in the Aerospace Defense Industry, proceedings of the 1st CIRP Industrial Product-
Service Systems (IPS2) Conference, Cranfield University, 1-2 April 2009, pp. 230. 
 
[25] R. H. Yeh and W. L. Chang, Optimal threshold value of failure-rate for leased products with 
preventive maintenance actions, Mathematical and Computer Modeling, Vol. 46, 2007, pp. 730-737.  
 
[26] K. Feldman, Electronic Prognostics and Health Management: A Return on Investment Analysis, 
Master of Science Thesis, Mechanical Engineering, University of Maryland, May 2008, URL: 
http://hdl.handle.net/1903/8323.  
 
[27] P. A. Sandborn and C. Wilkinson, “A Maintenance Planning and Business Case Development 
Model for the Application of Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) to Electronic Systems,” 
Microelectronics Reliability, vol. 47, no. 12, pp. 1889-1901, December 2007. 
 
[28] C. Valdez-Flores and R. Feldman, “A Survey of Preventative Maintenance Models for 
Stochastically Determining Single-Unit Systems,” Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 36, pp. 419–446, 
1989. 
 
[29] D. Cho and M. Parlar, “A Survey of Preventative Maintenance Models for Multi-Unit Systems,” 
European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 51, pp. 1–23, 1991. 
 
[30] W. Wang, “A Model to Determine the Optimal Critical Level and the Monitoring Intervals in 
Condition-Based Maintenance,” International Journal of Production Research, Vol. 38, No. 6, pp. 
1425–1436, 2000. 
 
[31] A. Barros, C. Berenguer, and A. Grall, “Optimization of Replacement Times Using Imperfect 
Monitoring Information,” IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 523–533, 2003. 
 
[32] G. Heinrich and U. Jensen, “Bivariate Lifetime Distributions and Optimal Replacement,” 




[33] T.  Raivio, E. Kuumola, V. A. Mattila, K. Virtanen, and R. P. Hämäläinen, “A Simulation Model 
for Military Aircraft Maintenance and Availability,” Proceedings of the European Simulation 
Multiconference, pp. 190–194, September 2001. 
 
[34] L. Warrington, J. A. Jones and N. Davis, “Modeling of Maintenance, within Discrete Event 
Simulation,” Proceedings of the Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), Seattle, WA, pp. 
260–265, January 2002. 
 
[35] Y. Lin, A. Hsu, and R. Rajamani, “A Simulation Model for Field Service with Condition-Based 
Maintenance,” Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference, San Diego, CA, pp. 1885–1890, 
December 2002. 
 
[36] J. J. Luna, “A probabilistic model for evaluating PHM effectiveness,” Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Prognostics and Health Management, Denver, CO, October 2008. 
 
[37] J. J. Luna, “Metrics, Models, and Scenarios for Evaluating PHM Effects on Logistics Support,” 
Proceedings of the 1
st
 Annual Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management Society, San 
Diego, CA, Oct 2009. 
 
[38] C. Byington, M. Watson, and D. Edwards D., “Data-Driven Neural Network Methodology to 
Remaining Life Predictions for Aircraft Actuator Components,” IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, 
MT, March 2004. 
 
[39] S. Mishra, S. Ganesan, M. Pecht, J. Xie, "Life consumption monitoring for electronics 
prognostics," IEEE Aerospace Conference Proceedings, volume 5, pp. 3455-3466, December 2004. 
 
[40] N. Vichare, P. Rodgers, and M. Pecht, “Methods for Binning and Density Estimation of Load 
Parameters for Prognostics and Health Management,” International Journal of Performability  
Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 149–161, 2006. 
 
[41] A. Khalak and J. Tierno, “Influence of Prognostics Health Management on Logistics Supply 
Chain,” Proceedings of the American Control Conference, Minneapolis, MN, pp. 3737-3742, June 
2006. 
 
[42] K. Feldman, T. Jazouli, and P. Sandborn, “A Methodology for Determining the Return on 
Investment Associated with Prognostics and Health Management,” IEEE Trans. on Reliability, vol. 58, 
no. 2, pp. 305-316, June 2009. 
 
[43] E. Scanff, K. Feldman, S. Ghelam, P. Sandborn, M. Glade, and B. Foucher, “Life cycle cost 
estimation of using prognostic health management for helicopter avionics,” Microelectronic 
Reliability, vol. 47, no. 12, pp. 1857-1864, December 2007. 
 
[44] http://www.prognostics.umd.edu/membersOnly/ROITool/PHM_ROI.htm  
 
[45] G. Janakiraman, J. R. Santos, and Y. Turner, “Automated System Design for Availability,” in 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN'04), 2004. 
 
[46] H. F. Castro and K. L. Cavalca, “Availability optimization with genetic algorithm,” Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, vol. 91, no. 4,  pp. 413-420, April 2006. 
 
[47] D. M. Raffo and S. Setamanit, “Supporting Software Process Decisions Using Bi-directional 
Simulation,” International Journal of Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering (IJSEKE), 
vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 513-530, 2003. 
 
[48] A. P. Reynolds and G. P. McKeown, “Construction of factory schedules using reverse 




[49] A. Henkle, C. Lindsey, and M. Bernson, “Southwest Airlines: A review of the operational and 
cultural aspects of Southwest Airlines,” Operations Management Course Presentation, Sloan School of 
Management, Summer 2002. 
 
[50] Federal Aviation Administration, “Investment Analysis Benefit Guidelines: Quantifying Flight 
Efficiency Benefits,” Version 3.0, Investment Analysis and Operations Research Group, June 2001. 
 
[51] A. Henkle, C. Lindsey, and M. Bernson, Southwest Airlines: A review of the operational and 
cultural aspects of Southwest Airlines, Operations Management Course Presentation, Sloan School of 
Management, 2002. 
 
[52] D. Kumar, J. Crocker, J. Knezevic, and M. El-Haram, Reliability, Maintenance and Logistic 
Support: A Life Cycle Approach, Springer, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
